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PURSUANT TO RULE 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner
Jodi Howick ("Howick") submits this brief
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final action or order of
the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(6) (2007).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Howick presents the following issues for review by this Court:
I.

Whether the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board (the "Board")

abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was not entitled to the
protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007) because she was allegedly an
at-will employee under the law.1 The standard for appellate review of this issue is
de novo for correctness pursuant to Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, f
11,122 P.3d 521. This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal filed
July 1,2008.
II.

Whether the Board abused its discretion by violating, and in effect

upholding a violation of, Howick's due process rights pursuant to the Utah
Constitution Article 1, § 7. The standard for appellate review of this issue is de
novo for correctness pursuant to Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d

References to codes, ordinances, policies and procedures in this Brief refer to
those in effect in 2007.
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23, 27 (Utah App. 1991). This issue was preserved by Howick's Notice of Appeal
filed July 1,2008.
III.

Whether Howick is entitled to attorney fees and costs under this

Court's inherent power in the interest of justice and equity and under the due
process provisions of the Utah Constitution. The standard for appellate review of
attorney fees issues constitutes a matter within this Court's discretion pursuant to
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 781-782 (Utah 1994);
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT App 22, U 10, 177 P.3d 621; and
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County School Dist, 2000 UT 87, If 20,
16 P.3d 533. This issue could not be raised in the proceeding before the Board
because it is without authority to award fees. Salt Lake City Employee Appeals
Board Procedures I, C (the "Procedures"), attached as Appendix 2.
LAWS TO BE INTERPRETED
The following are constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal. The full text of the following citations is set forth in
Appendix 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702, 815 and 1221 (2007).
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE

§ 2.52.130 (2007).

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE

§§ 2.53.020, 030 and 060 (2007).
2

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, POLICY

3.01.02 (2007).

Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board denying Ho wick an appeal
from the termination of her employment by the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office
in August 2007. The Utah Municipal Code requires cities to provide all but a few
categories of municipal employees an appeal if their employment is terminated.
Ho wick believed she was entitled to the protections of the Code, but the City
rebuffed her efforts to have the termination reconsidered. When Howick first
attempted to obtain a hearing before the Board, the Salt Lake City Labor Relations
Officer refused to forward her appeal to the Board on the grounds that Howick
was working in an alleged "at-will" position and was therefore not entitled to
appeal to the Board.
Howick appealed the City's determination to this Court. This Court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick's appeal because the Board
had not issued a final action due to the City's refusal to forward her appeal to the
Board. However, this Court noted that Howick could seek redress through an
extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to hear her appeal.
Upon receipt of this Court's decision, the City forwarded Howick's appeal
to the Board. In response, the Board sought a legal opinion about whether
Howick's position was an at-will position. Without considering any of Howick's
3

legal arguments demonstrating that her position could not be made at-will by the
City, the Board decided that she was an at-will employee and not entitled to an
appeal. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Howick was employed by the City in the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office
("Attorney's Office") from 1992 to August 2007 as a staff attorney. R. 108-130.
In 1998, the Attorney's Office purported to create a new "at-will" attorney
position outside of the City's merit system. Staff attorneys were asked to agree to
move to the newly-created position in exchange for a raise in pay. Howick moved
to this position and signed a document titled "At-Will Employment Disclaimer" in
connection with the move. R. 63.
The newly-created position was titled "Appointed Senior City Attorney."
The job description for the new position is substantially identical to the City's
"Senior City Attorney" job description in its 600 Series Compensation Plan,
except that the "Appointed Senior City Attorney" description requires two
additional years of experience as a prerequisite for moving to that position and
identifies it as an at-will position. This new position was originally included as a
part of the City's 600 Series Compensation Plan and was moved a few years later
to a newly-created pay plan called the Unclassified Compensation Plan. Most

4

staff attorneys in the Attorney's Office work under the "Appointed Senior City
Attorney" job description.2 R. 48, 65-68
During her 15 years of service, Ho wick worked with many different City
managers and received outstanding performance evaluations. R. 110-130. Then
in August 2007, Ho wick's supervisor, Ed Rutan ("Rutan"), City Attorney,
terminated her employment without any prior notice and without any cause
explicitly on the basis of her alleged at-will status and in violation of the
protections afforded to merit system employees by the Utah Municipal Code.
Rutan gave Howick no documentation. R. 108. Ho wick believed that her
termination violated the requirements of the Utah Municipal Code and asked
several times to meet with Rutan to discuss the basis of his action. However,
Rutan refused to meet with her. R. 48; Petitioner's Docketing Statement, Case No.
20070863, attached as Appendix 4, at Exhibit B.

City compensation plans and job descriptions are available at
http://www.slcgov.com/iobs. In July, 2008, the City changed its compensation
plans to place its Unclassified Compensation Plan in its Executive Compensation
Plan. See June 3, 2008 Salt Lake City Council Staff Report
www.slcgov.com/council/agendas (follow "June" hyperlink; then follow "Item
A10 Compensation Budget FY 08 09" hyperlink under the June 3, 2008 Staff
Report Attachments heading (last visited October 1, 2008)), attached as Appendix
3. See also Executive Compensation Plan (sections I, II, III, XVI, XVII and App.
A) www.slcgov.com/iobs (follow "City Compensation Plans" hyperlink; then
search for "Appointed Compensation"; follow match 6 hyperlink "Compensation
Plan for Salt Lake City Corporation Appointed Employees and Elected Officials
(last visited October 1, 2008)), also attached as Appendix 3. The "Appointed
Senior City Attorney" job description is currently classified under the Executive
Compensation Plan as "Level 003." See Executive Compensation Plan, Appendix
3. The former Unclassified Compensation Plan is publicly available through the
Salt Lake City recorder's Office.
5

On September 10, 2007, after being rebuffed in her efforts to discuss the
basis for her termination, including the legality of treating her as an at-will
employee, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal with the Salt Lake City Recorder to
obtain an appeal before the Board as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(3)(a) and City ordinances and procedures. R. 108-130. The City's Labor
Relations Officer, who staffs the Board in the appeal process, refused to initiate
the appeal process and instead obtained information relating to Howick's former
position in the Attorney's Office. The Labor Relations Officer's supervisor, as the
City's acting Labor Relations Officer, then issued a letter stating that she had
"determined" that Howick was an at-will employee and therefore not entitled to an
appeal. Appendix 4, Exhibits A and B. Howick contacted the City pointing out
that the Labor Relations Officer's action was contrary to both State law and City
ordinance and policy, but the City refused to refer Howick's appeal to the Board.
Appendix 4, Exhibits B and C.
On October 22, 2007, Howick filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Case
No. 20070863, Notice of Appeal. The Court made a sua sponte Motion for
Summary Disposition to determine if it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The
Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Howick's appeal because of the
refusal of the City to refer Howick's appeal to the Board. The Court dismissed
Howick's appeal, but noted in its decision that the City's handling of Howick's
appeal to the Board violated the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
Procedures (the "Procedures") and that Howick could seek redress through an
6

extraordinary writ or other action to require the Board to issue a final agency
decision on its own jurisdiction. See Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT
App 216, 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 212.
Upon receipt of this Court's decision, the City referred Howick's appeal to
the Board. The Board acknowledged receipt of the appeal on June 20, 2008.
R. 104. The Board informed Howick and the City that they could submit
documentation related to Howick's appeal for consideration at the Board's
meeting on June 26, 2008, but the Board permitted Howick no other participation
in its process. R. 74-76, 99-101, 104. Howick submitted a memorandum of law
arguing that she was entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106
because her staff attorney position could not lawfully be made an at-will position.
R. 47-68. The City submitted a letter arguing that a court, and not the Board,
should determine whether Howick could be treated by the City as an at-will
employee. R. 27-46.
On July 1, 2008, pursuant to its Procedures, the Board requested a legal
opinion regarding whether Howick was properly classified as an at-will employee
from the City Attorney. R. 96; Procedures III.G at Appendix 2. The City
Attorney retained special counsel of his choosing, Stanley Preston ("Preston"), to
provide the requested opinion. R. 94-95. The opinion found that Howick's
position could legally be classified as an at-will position without addressing
Howick's legal contentions regarding the City's authority and the requirements of
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 ("Section 10-3-1105") and 1106 ("Section 10-31106"). R. 81-87.
On July 15, 2008, in a meeting lasting approximately two minutes, three of
five members of the Board met and decided to adopt the conclusions of the special
counsel selected by the City Attorney. R. Exhibit A at 2-3. The Board decided
that based on Ho wick's alleged at-will status, she was not entitled to the
protections of Section 10-3-1106, thereby upholding the at-will termination of
Howick's employment. R. Exhibit A at 3. The Board certified its decision to the
Salt Lake City Recorder on July 15, 2008, R. 73, and Howick filed a Notice of
Appeal to this Court on July 18, 2008.
The Board met in closed sessions. R. 99-101; 74-76. Howick was
permitted no participation in the proceedings before the Board, other than
submitting her memorandum. She was not given access to the Preston opinion
until Board staff provided Howick with a copy of the record on August 7, 2008,
three weeks after the Board's decision. Letter from Shelly Chapman, Salt Lake
City Corporation, August 7, 2008, attached as Appendix 5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Board abused its discretion when it determined that Howick was

not entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106. Rather, the City exceeded the
statutory authority granted to it under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 and violated
the Utah Municipal Code and City requirements when it classified Howick's
employment at-will, terminated her employment on the basis of this alleged at-will
8

status and denied her the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The City cannot
violate or exceed its authority under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 by any means,
whether by ordinance, policy, procedure or contract, and it cannot circumvent the
requirements of its own ordinances mandating that the City follow these statutes.
Consistent with this Court's previous determinations, municipal actions that
exceed their authority are void and cannot be given any effect. The City was
obligated to comply with statutory provisions in its rules and in its dealings with
its employees, and Howick had the right to expect that the City would. The Board
decision should therefore be reversed and Howick should be reinstated and
awarded back pay and benefits.
II.

The City, the Board, and the Board staff also violated Howick's

rights to due process. Howick had a property interest in her employment created
by State law and was therefore entitled to pre and post termination due process.
She received neither. Due process also requires that the proceedings provided by
the Board be meaningful and fair, and they were not. A violation of due process
by a Utah governmental agency is an abuse of discretion, and also requires the
Board's decision to be reversed and Howick to be reinstated with back pay and
benefits.
III.

Howick is entitled to attorney fees under this Court's inherent power

in the interest of justice and equity pursuant to the private attorney general
doctrine and for acts by the City that were in bad faith, vexatious, wanton and for
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oppressive reasons. She is also entitled to attorney fees under the due process
provisions of the Utah Constitution Article 1, § 7.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING
THAT HOWICK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS
OF SECTION 10-3-1106 BASED ON HER ALLEGED AT-WILL
STATUS.
A.

MISINTERPRETING THE LAW IS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

This Court reviews the Board's final action to determine if the Board
"abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(6)(c). The Board requested a legal opinion "about whether the conversion of
Ms. Ho wick's position to an 'at-will' position was done appropriately." R. 96.
Based on the legal opinion it received, the Board determined that "it did not have
the authority to review the appeal of Ms. Ho wick" because Howick was an "atwill" employee. Final Action, R. 73.3
The Board thus found it had no jurisdiction by adopting a legal conclusion
that the protections of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 did not apply to Howick. "In
cases where the basic question is what does the law require? the standard is a
correction of error standard." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23,
28 (Ut. App. 1991) (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). When "a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of
While Mr. Buckley's letter states that the vote of the Board was unanimous, only
three of the five Board members were present. See Final Action, R. 73;
Attestation, R. 75.
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discretion and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no
deference to such decisions because we are in as good a position as the tribunal to
determine the law. Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is
an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law." Id. at
27. 4
B.

THE BOARD MISINTERPRETED STATE LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT HO WICK'S POSITION WAS AT-WILL.

Ho wick's position cannot be made at-will under the Utah Municipal Code,
and thus she cannot be denied the protections of Section 10-3-1106. The Utah
State Legislature has created protections for municipal employees and mandated
restrictions on municipal employment actions under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.
Under those mandates, "fejxcept as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of
a municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to
discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-3-1106." Utah Code Ann. § 10-31105(1) (emphasis added). Among the rights included in Section 10-3-1106, "[i]f
an employee is discharged . . . the employee may . . . appeal the discharge . . . to a
board to be known as the employee appeal board . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 10-31106(2)(a).

4

This Court noted that when it acts to correct a misinterpretation of law, it is
finding an abuse of discretion by the tribunal. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27.

11

Subsection 10-3-1105(2) states, "fsjubsection (1) [the grant of protected
employment] does not apply to [the specifically listed employees in Subsections
(2)(a) - (1)]." Utah Code Ann. § 1105(2) (emphasis added.) This statutory
language is unequivocal. It expressly grants the protections of Section 10-3-1106
to each employee of a municipality except when the employee is in a position
enumerated in the list of exceptions in Section 10-3-1105(2). The Utah Supreme
Court has stated:
When interpreting statutory law, our "primary g o a l . . . is to give
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." We also
"assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly."
Moutv v. Sandy City, 2005 UT 41, If 17, 122 P.3d 521 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
Courts look to the plain language of a statute when interpreting statutory
law. The plain language of Section 10-3-1105 does not exempt Howick's former
position with Salt Lake City from statutory protections. The employees listed in
Subsection (2) are: an officer of the City appointed by the mayor or by the
comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government,5 a police or
fire department employee, a police chief or deputy police chief, a fire chief or

5

The City does not contend that Howick was an officer of the City, and neither
could she have been one. As defined in the Salt Lake City Code, the term
"'officer' means and includes officers and boards in charge of departments and the
members of such boards." Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 1.04.010(C)(12). As one
of numerous staff attorneys for the City, Howick was not in charge of the City
Attorney's Office or any other department.
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deputy or assistant fire chief, a department head or deputy department head, a
superintendent, or a probationary, part-time or seasonal employee. Ho wick was
employed as a staff attorney in the City Attorney's Office for 15 years under a job
description used by many members of that Office. This position is not included
within the list at Subsection (2).
Courts also assume that each term in a statute is used advisedly. The
language of Subsection 10-3-1105(2) is drafted precisely, and the Legislature used
its terms advisedly. For example, when the Legislature amended this section in
2004, it specifically added the term "assistant" to Subsection 1105(2)(f) in order to
include an "assistant fire chief on the list of employees not subject to statutory
protections. Minutes of the Senate Government Operations & Political
Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 23, 2004)
http://www.le.state.us/~2004/minutes/SGOP0123.pdf. See also Minutes of the
House Political Subdivisions Standing Committee (January 30, 2004)
http://www.le.state.us/-2004/minutes/HPOL0130.pdf (amendment introduced at
urging of Utah League of Cities and Towns). The Legislature did not contemplate
that other positions, such as this "assistant fire chief position, could be denied
statutory protections unless they were expressly added to the list.6

6

Other governmental entities also recognize that a position may not be removed
from a statutory merit employment system without Legislative authorization. For
example, when the State of Utah wanted to remove certain information technology
positions from the state merit system, it pursued an amendment to add Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19-15(l)(t) in 2005. When Salt Lake County wanted to remove
division directors who report to an elected official from its merit system at the
13

The Legislature's express list of exemptions at Section 10-3-1105 cannot be
interpreted to include employment positions that the Legislature omitted. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "' statutory construction presumes that the
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.' Thus, we
should give effect to any omission in the ordinance language by presuming that
the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^ 30, 104
P.3d 1208 (quoting Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, U 14, 993 P.2d
875). The Legislature placed specific and intentionally selected positions on its
list at Subsection 10-3-1105(2), omitting all others, and Howick's position is not
listed.
Under the plain language of the statute, Howick's position falls under the
broad mandate of Subsection (1) requiring that each employee of a municipality
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge only as
provided in Section 10-3-1106 and having a right to appeal a discharge. The
Legislature has not exempted Howick's position from the statutory protections of
Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and she is therefore entitled to them.

urging of the Salt Lake District Attorney, the Legislature permitted that change,
but grandfathered existing employees in those division director positions. See
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1 (2008); S.B. 78, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2008). See also
DA. makes case for - cronyism?\ S.L. Tribune, Feb. 10, 2008. No such changes
have ever been made to the municipal merit system to permit a city to deny a
municipal staff attorney position the protections of Section 10-3-1106.
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C.

SALT LAKE CITY CANNOT EXCEED ITS STATUTORY
AUTHORITY AND VIOLATE THE UTAH MUNICIPAL
CODE REGARDLESS OF THE MEANS IT USES, AND ITS
ATTEMPTS TO DO SO ARE VOID.

Through its ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts, Salt Lake City
has repeatedly attempted to give itself the power to create at-will positions and
deny City employees statutory protections in violation of statute and in excess of
the power granted by the Legislature under Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.
However, regardless of the means it uses, the City cannot violate the mandates of
the Legislature and exceed its statutory authority. "Whatever power or authority
municipalities in this state have is derived from the Legislature." Salt Lake City v.
Sutter, 216 P. 234, 237 (Utah 1923). "Local governments, as subdivisions of the
State, exercise those powers granted to them by the State Legislature, [citing
cases] and the exercise of a delegated power is subject to the limitations imposed
by state statutes and state and federal constitutions." Harding v. Alpine City, 656
P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980)). Since Salt Lake City, as a political subdivision of the State, is a creature
of statute, its powers are limited to those found in statute. The City is thus bound
by the mandates of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and it cannot make Howick an
at-will employee in violation of law and in excess of the scope of its powers under
those statutes.
If the City attempts to circumvent the Legislature's directives, the City's
acts are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation . . . . Of every municipal
corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its organic
act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act, or make
any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby, or by
some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond the scope of
the powers granted are void.
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P. at 235 (emphasis omitted) quoting 1 Dillon on
Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 237. While Utah courts no longer strictly
construe a legislative grant of general welfare power to local governments, "local
governments are without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in
conflict with, state statutory law." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1121.
Provisions of law that are illegal and void cannot be given any effect. This
Court has stated that when it encounters such provisions, whether in the form of a
regulation, rule or otherwise, or actions taken pursuant to them, this Court has "a
duty to invalidate them." Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 1999 UT App 42, \ 5,
975 P.2d 935. (quoting Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119,
1122 (Utah App. 1988). See also, Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46, 49 (Utah App.
1989).

7

City actions cannot be "directly prohibited by, or .. . inconsistent with the policy
of, the state or federal laws or the constitution of this State or of the United
States." Id. at 1126.
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1.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Ordinance.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-702 affirms that, "[t]he governing body may pass
any ordinance to regulate, require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any
activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other
provision of law." (Emphasis added.) While municipalities may pass ordinances,
they may only do so to the extent those ordinances are authorized by the Utah
Municipal Code or other provisions of law. "It is well established that, where a
city ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its
inception." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 15, 116 P.3d 290 (finding Salt Lake
City ordinance invalid to the extent that it permitted what state law prohibited.)
The Legislature's mandates at Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 are express
limitations on the power that a city is authorized to exercise, and the City cannot
exceed them.
In its ordinances, Salt Lake City states that any employee has the right to
appeal a discharge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 except "a) those
employees set forth in section 10-3-1105(2). . . and b) at-will employees. . . ."
Salt Lake City Code § 2.52.130 (emphasis added). This ordinance provision
purports to give the City power to create "at-will" positions exempt from statutory

o

Even when a city acts under a general welfare clause, specific grants of power
"may serve to limit the means available under the general welfare clause, for some
limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of power
in a particular manner." Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1126.
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protections in addition to those allowed by the Legislature in Subsection 10-31105(2). This provision exceeds the Legislature's statutory grant of authority and
violates Section 10-3-1105, and as such it is void.
2.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Policies and Procedures.

Salt Lake City has also adopted policies and procedures by which it
attempts to give itself an expanded power to create at-will positions. However,
just as a city cannot use an ordinance to violate the law or exceed the scope of its
statutory authority, it likewise cannot do so by using a policy or procedure.
An administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations is
limited to those regulations which are consonant with the statutory
framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope.
Administrative regulations may not conflict with the design of an
Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate them . . .
Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute
and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess
of administrative authority granted . . . Agency regulations may not
abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] statute . . . .
Draughon, 1999 UT App 42 at \ 5 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). See
also Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49 (a policy more restrictive than a rule promulgated
under a statute abrogates the Legislature's objective, and u[w]hen such
administrative regulations and policies 'conflict with the design of an Act,' we
have a duty to invalidate them" (citation omitted)).
These City policies and procedures also violate other sections of State law,
including an express mandate that the Legislature imposes on cities to follow the
requirements of the Legislature's merit employment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
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3-1221 states, "[e]ach officer [of a city] shall have the power to prescribe rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with general law, the municipal administrative code
[the city's ordinances], and the merit plan" (emphasis added). Likewise, under
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, "[t]he governing body of each municipality shall
prescribe rules and regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this
state, as it deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation,
conduct, and business of the municipality." (Emphasis added.)
Salt Lake City Policy 3.01.02 ("City Policies 3.01.01")attempts to define atwill positions by stating, "[a]t-will positions are: A. Executive employees who
report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director; B. Unclassified Employees;
C. Part-time and seasonal employees; and, D. Regular employees who have not
yet completed their probationary period." This policy makes no reference to
Section 10-3-1105, and it designates employees without regard for that section's
statutory requirements. To the extent it designates positions as at-will which are
not listed in Section 10-3-1105(2), it is void.
Further, in the Salt Lake City's Employee Appeal Board Procedures, the
City states that its appeal process is available to "each employee of the City"
except those in thirteen listed positions. Procedures I, E, Appendix 2.. For ease of
comparison, the positions excepted by Section 10-3-1105(2) are set forth below
next to the City's list.
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City Procedures

Section 10-34105(2)

1. an officer appointed by the (a) an officer appointed by the mayor or
Mayor or the Mayor's
other person or body exercising
designee;
executive power in the municipality;
2. a mem ber of the police
department or fire
department who is a
member of the classified
civil service;

(b) a member of the municipality's
police department or fire department
who is a member of the classified
civil service in a first or second
class city;

3. a police chief;

(c) a police chief of the municipality;

4. a deputy police chief;

(d) a deputy police chief of the
municipality;

5. a fire chief;

(e) a fire chief of the municipality;

6. a deputy or assistant fire
chief;

(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the
municipality;

7. a head of a City
department;

(g) a head of a municipal department;

8. a deputy head of a City
department;

(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal
department;

9. a superintendent;

(i) a superintendent;

10. a probationary employee;

(j) a probationary employee of the
municipality;

11. an hourly part-time
employee;

(k) a part-time employee of the
municipality; or

12. seasonal employee; or

(1) a seasonal employee of the
municipality.

13. any other at-will
employee.
The City's list follows the State statute with two exceptions. First, the City
attempts to expand its powers under its first exception beyond the Legislature's
mandate that exempted officers are those appointed by the mayor or the
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comparable person or body in other forms of municipal government. Second, the
City's thirteenth exception is not contained in the statute. Like City Policy
3.01.02, this section of the Procedures attempts to give the City the ability to
create at-will positions without regard for statutory requirements. Like City Policy
3.01.02, it violates State statutory requirements under Sections 10-3-1105 and 103-1106, and under Sections 10-3-1221 and 10-3-815, and to that extent it is void.
3.

Salt Lake City Cannot Violate the Law or Exceed Its Statutory
Authority By Contract.

In addition to violating State requirements through ordinances, policies, and
procedures, Salt Lake City also attempts to give itself an expanded power to
designate at-will positions in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 by
contract. However, all of Salt Lake City's contractual efforts to create at-will
positions and deny statutory protections in violation of Sections 10-3-1105 and 103-1106 are void. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that cities cannot exceed
statutory restrictions on their powers by using contracts. "Neither the corporation
nor its officers can do any act, or make any contract. . . not authorized [by the
statutes creating the city]." Sutter.216 P. at 235 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a governmental entity's personnel
policies constitute contracts, not legislative acts, and that a governmental entity
lacks authority to promulgate such contracts in contravention of Utah statutory
law. University of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, H 26, 28 and 56, 144 P.3d
1109 (finding that university personnel policies were contractual and could not
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restrict firearms in contravention of statute). Further, public employees have the
right to expect that their employers will create contracts that comply with the law.
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d at 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995 (quoting
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992)) (employee
wrongfully terminated since "[t]he County had an obligation to comply with the
statutory provisions . . . in writing its manual and dealing with employees, and
Thurston had the right to expect that the County would"). See also, Brummitt v.
Ogden Waterworks Co., 93 P. 828 (Utah 1908) (portions of municipal contracts
that exceed statutory powers are void, although other portions of the contract may
be enforced).
In this case, Salt Lake City has issued contracts in the form of policies,
procedures, compensation plans, job descriptions and disclaimers all purporting to
designate positions as at-will without regard to Section 10-3-1105(2). Under some
of these documents, the City specifically designates Howick's position as being atwill. The City also argues that Howick signed one such document in 1998
agreeing that her position would thereafter be designated as at-will. As
demonstrated above, the City cannot circumvent State law by contract because
such contracts, whether issued as a general personnel policy or entered into with a
specific person, exceed the City's authority and are void and unenforceable.
The Preston opinion advised the Board that the City has the power to
exceed statutory limitations on its powers through the use of contracts, but this
argument is clearly in error. As Preston notes, a city may voluntarily undertake an
22

additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to perform, but its acts
cannot be "inconsistent with the underlying statute." Preston Opinion, R. 85.
Additional contractual rights "[can] not alter or contradict an employee's statutory
rights." Code v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 2007 UT App 390,1J6, 174 P.2d 1134
(quoting Buckner v. Rennard, 2004 UT 78,1f 32, n.4, 99 P.3d 842).
Preston also advised the Board that if municipal employee rights can be
expanded by contract, it follows that Howick could waive statutory and
constitutional employment protections. Preston Opinion, R. 86. Again, this
argument is clearly in error. As Preston noted, this issue involves "whether the
City could ask Ms. Howick to agree to waive those statutory rights." Preston
Opinion, R. 85. The law clearly prohibits the City from exceeding its authority,
and Howick cannot give to the City powers that the Legislature expressly withheld
for the protection of city employees. Howick cannot give the City the power to
circumvent a legislative policy. "Whatever power or authority municipalities in
this state have is derived from the Legislature" Sutter, 216 P. at 237 (emphasis
added). "Local governments . . . exercise those powers granted to them by the

9

See also Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Utah App. 1992)
(finding that a waiver and release agreement purporting to release claims arising
from employment, including Fair Labor Standards Act claims, was unenforceable
as a matter of law as against public policy; "contracts tending to encourage
violation of laws are void as contrary to public policy . . . To permit an employer
to secure a release from the worker . . . will tend to nullify the deterrent effect
which Congress plainly intended that [FLSA] should have. Knowledge on the part
of the employer that he cannot escape liability . . . by taking advantage of the
needs of his employees tends to insure compliance in the first place." (Citations
omitted)). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231. 236 (Utah 1985)
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State Legislature . . . ." Harding v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986 (emphasis
added).
Salt Lake City cannot circumvent the limitations on its powers or violate
the mandates of the Utah Municipal Code by asking for Ho wick's agreement.
Where the Legislature gives the City no power to act, Howick cannot provide it.
Instead, the City has "an obligation to comply with the statutory provisions" in its
employment practices, and Howick has "the right to expect that the County [City]
would." Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038.
Salt Lake City cannot use any means to avoid or violate the mandates of
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 and other provisions of State code, and all of
the City's efforts to do so are void. Irrespective of the manner of implementation,
whenever the City exceeds its statutory authority or violates the law, its acts are
void, and this Court has a duty to invalidate those provisions of City ordinances,
policies, procedures, and contracts, and actions taken pursuant to them.

(finding that where a household exclusion clause impacted minimum liability
coverages mandated by state statute for operating a motor vehicle, it was "contrary
to the public policy of this state and the statutory requirements found in the NoFault Insurance Act as to the minimum benefits provided by statute[,]" and the
contract clause thus was invalid.); Code, 2007 UT App 390 at 1 6 ("[P]ublic
employees' employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from
legislative policy." (quoting Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 Utah App. 100, | 8,
46 P.3d 247).
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D.

SALT LAKE CITY ACTED IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN
ORDINANCES REQUIRING IT TO COMPLY WITH STATE
LAW.

City ordinances mandate that the City comply with state employment laws,
and they place an affirmative duty on the City to remedy any violations. Salt Lake
City Code §§ 2.53.020 and 2.53.030(A) expressly mandate that the City must
follow State requirements in City employment practices. Salt Lake City Code §
2.53.020 provides that it covers employment practices and decisions relating to the
City's "classified career and civil service systems," which it defines to mean
"those job positions in Salt Lake City government lawfully included in the
classified career and civil service system, as defined in title 10, chapter 3 of the
Utah Code Annotated, the City ordinances and City policies enacted pursuant
thereto." (Emphasis added.) The Code further states, "[e]mployment decisions
and practices in Salt Lake City government's classified civil or career service
systems that are contrary to state or federal law are prohibited." Salt Lake City
Code § 2.53.030(A) (emphasis added). Thus, under the City's own ordinances,
the City must comply with Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106, and City actions taken
contrary to those statutes are prohibited.
Further, if the City takes an unlawful employment action, City ordinances
impose an affirmative duty on the City to correct unlawful practices. Under Salt
Lake City Code § 2.53.060(A), "[i]f there has been a violation of this chapter,
corrective, curative, or preventive action shall be taken to ensure that violations of
this chapter, similar to those found, will not recur." (Emphasis added). Among
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this section's requirements, the employee "shall be provided relief, which may
include . . . 2. Cancellation of an unwarranted employment action; [and] 3.
Restoration of the employee to the position the employee would have occupied
absent the violation . . . ." Id at 2.53.060(B) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated above, the City's efforts to make Howick's position at-will
violated the Utah Municipal Code and exceeded its authority and are void, and the
City's own ordinances require compliance with State law. The Board's decision,
which was based entirely on Howick's allegedly at-will status, should therefore be
reversed, and Howick should be reinstated with back pay and benefits.
II.

HOWICK HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND SHOULD BE
REINSTATED.
A.

HOWICK HAS A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT.

This Court has "referred to public employment as a property right requiring
due process upon discharge." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n, 949
P.2d 746, 752 n.2 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't., 616
P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980)).10 "[P]ublic employees have a property interest in
continued employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued
employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752
(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972).
10

"Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the
due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (citing
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n., 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942)).
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This Court in Lucas found that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 created a property
interest in continued employment for municipal police officers because it granted
civil service employees security against discharge without cause and that section
of State code "thus limits both the department head's and the Commission's
discretion in making employment decisions." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 752-53.
Like Section 10-3-1012, Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 guarantee continued
employment for municipal employees by imposing limits on managerial
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1) provides, "[e]xcept as provided in
Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge . . . only as provided in Section 10-31106." Section 10-3-1106 limits a municipal employer's discretion by providing
that employees may not be discharged for the reasons stated in Subsection (1) or
without sufficient cause pursuant to Subsection (3)(b).
Additional limitations on municipal action are imposed under an appeal
board's rules and standards of review as established by city ordinance pursuant to
Section 10-3-1106(7). Under Salt Lake City Code ^ 2.24.060, the Board must
determine whether an adverse action was warranted, meaning that the facts
support a need for "discipline or other remedial action, " and if so, whether the
action taken was proportionate to the charges. (Emphasis added.)
As demonstrated in Section I of this Brief, Howick is entitled to the
protections of Section 10-3-1106. She thus has a property interest - "a vested
right to continued employment absent a legal cause for termination." Lucas, 949
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P.2d at 753. However, the City terminated Howick's employment at-will, and the
Board denied jurisdiction based on her alleged at-will status. The Board denied
Howick due process that is constitutionally mandated to protect her property
interest when it upheld the City's at-will termination of Howick's employment.11
Howick is therefore entitled to reinstatement.
B.

THE CITY AND BOARD VIOLATED HOWICK'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEDURES ADEQUATE TO
PROTECT A PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT.

This Court has found that "[i]f a property interest in continued employment
exists, then the employee is entitled to procedures comporting with the minimum
requirements of due process, as provided in the Constitution." Lucas, 949 P.2d at
752. In considering "what process is due" to protect a property interest in
continued employment, this Court has held that a deprivation must "'bepreceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing' . . . [and this] is not a matter of legislative
grace, but of'constitutional guarantee.'" Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57,
(1950)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487,
1492(1985).
Specifically, this Court found that "before termination, minimum due
process entitles an employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an
11

"It is a clear abuse of discretion for . . . [an administrative body] to exercise its
discretion in such a way as to deny due process to a party appearing before it."
Lucas, 949 P.2d at 754.
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explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to
present his or her side of the story in 'something less' than a full evidentiary
hearing." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 753 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 545). When
state statutes also provide for a full post-termination hearing, "the Loudermill
Court also determined that due process . . . required a full, timely post-termination
hearing." Id. The City and the Board failed to meet these procedural due process
requirements in Howick's case, and the Board abused its discretion by, in effect,
allowing her at-will termination to stand despite a lack of due process.
1.

Howick Received No Pretermination Process.

The City insisted that Howick was an at-will employee and claimed that it
did not have to have a reason for the decision to terminate her employment. The
City thus gave her no notice of any charges against her and no explanation of a
basis for any charges or opportunity to tell her side of any story, as mandated
under Lucas and Loudermill. However, Howick was not an at-will employee, and
the City violated Howick's right to due process before her termination. The
Board's decision upheld this denial of due process.
2.

The City and Board Failed To Provide Post-Termination Due
Process.

The City and its Board also failed to provide constitutionally mandated
post-termination hearing procedures. Pretermination procedures must be "coupled
with a full post-termination hearing cat a meaningful time.'" Lucas, 949 P.2d at
754, (citing Loudermill 470 U.S. at 546-47).
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Initially, the Board's staff denied Howick access to any post-termination
process based on a decision by the City Labor Relations Officer, who coordinates
and provides staff support to the Board under the Procedures. On appeal, this
Court pointed out that Howick had a right to obtain a determination from the
Board regarding its own jurisdiction and that the Labor Relations Officer had
interfered with that right.12
After this Court pointed out the City's violation of Howick's rights, her
Notice of Appeal was given to the Board. However, the procedure employed by
the Board again circumvented any meaningful review. Essentially, the City asked
its Board to return the matter to this Court, and the Board did so. Thus, the Board
failed to provide constitutionally-mandated post termination due process.
3.

The City and Board Failed to Provide a Meaningful and Fair
Proceeding in Violation of Due Process Requirements.

The Board also abused its discretion and denied Howick due process by
failing to provide her with any meaningful review. "It is a clear abuse of

12

"Salt Lake City's Employee Appeals Board procedures nowhere permit the
City's Labor Relations Officer to issue final decisions regarding the Board's
jurisdiction. Rather, those procedures allow the Board to request an opinion from
the City Attorney regarding questions of whether an employee is within the class
of persons who may appeal. See Salt Lake City Employee Board Procedures,
III(G), Appendix 2. Salt Lake City's method of dealing with Howick's notice of
appeal circumvents judicial review of the decision regarding the Board's
jurisdiction by substituting a letter from the Labor Relations Officer for a final
administrative decision of the Board." Howick, 2008 UT App 216. See also
Watson v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center, 75 F.3d 569, 580-81 (10th Cir. Utah
1996) (If an employer "agreed to follow a specific avenue to resolve the status of
plaintiffs employment, and then actively interfered with that process, they
violated plaintiffs right to procedural due process . . .")
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discretion for an administrative body to exercise its discretion over the manner in
which it conducts its proceedings such that it denies due process to a party
appearing before it." Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28.
This Court has stated that an employee can rely "upon any procedural
protections afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute." Lucas, 949 P.2d at
752. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "every person who brings a claim in
a court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal." Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 740P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987) (citing Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n,
696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985).
Due process requires certain safeguards. "At a minimum, timely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very
heart of procedural fairness." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876 (citations omitted).
"[TJhese protections are, indeed, fundamental rights which inure to the benefit of
every citizen of this state." Id. at 877. Furthermore, "[fjairness requires not only
an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of
unfairness." Bunnell 740 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, quotation omitted).
Further, due process requires that an administrative body consider the legal
contentions of the party appearing before it. This Court has stated "an agency
must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing before it."
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31 (citing Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Central Weber Sewer
Improv. Dist, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955)). A determination must be prepared
31

"in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the
ultimate conclusions." Id, at 32 n.8. The failure to address "legal contentions [is]
. . . an abuse of discretion . . ." Id. at 32. Additionally, "the making of a clearly
erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or
misinterpreting the law." Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
The Board's handling of Ho wick's appeal did not provide to Howick a fair
and meaningful proceeding before a fair tribunal. The Board met twice for a
combined total of 21 minutes. R. 8-25; R. Exhibit A. It permitted Howick no
participation in the proceeding other than the right to submit "written
documentation" to its first meeting, although the City's representative was present
during at least one Board meeting.13 R. 104. Howick submitted her legal
contentions to the Board. R. 47-68. Without addressing Howick's legal
contentions, the City argued that the Board should simply accept the City's
unlawful classification and allow this Court to consider Howick's contentions on
appeal. R. 27-46.
In response, the Board requested a legal opinion from the City Attorney,
who recused himself and selected Preston to provide the requested legal opinion.
R. 94-95. Preston opined that the City's actions were legal without ever
addressing Howick's contentions regarding the City's authority and the
requirements of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. R. 82-87. Three of the five Board

1 O

The City's Director of Human Resources, who has no role in the Board process,
attended at least the Board's first meeting. R. 100.
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members then met and adopted Preston's opinion in the Board's second meeting,
which lasted approximately two minutes. The Board adopted the opinion through
a verbal vote instead of a secret ballot as required by Section 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i).
R. Exhibit A at 3. Preston's opinion was in error, but Howick never even saw the
Preston opinion until the City produced the record to her three weeks after the
Board rendered its decision. Appendix 5.
These proceedings did not provide Howick any "opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful way." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876. The Board never considered
Howick's legal contentions as it must. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. The Board's
determination does not "demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the
ultimate conclusions." Id. at 32 n.8. By failing to provide a fair and meaningful
proceeding to Howick, the Board abused its discretion.
The City has twice demonstrated that it will not provide due process to
Howick. However, in this case, the Court's decision about the legality of treating
Howick as an at-will employee will resolve all issues before the Board. For that
reason, the Board's decision regarding Howick's status as an at-will employee
should be overturned, and Howick reinstated to her position.
III.

HOWICK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
Howick is entitled to the protections of Section 10-3-1106, and the actions

of the City, its Board and Board staff exceeded and violated the Utah Municipal
Code and Howick's constitutional rights to due process. Therefore, this Court
should award Howick attorney fees pursuant to the legal doctrines set forth below.
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A.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HO WICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON THE
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE.

Under their inherent power to award attorney fees in the interest of justice
and equity, "[cjourts have also awarded attorney fees to a party as a private
attorney general when the vindication of a strong or societally important public
policy takes place and the necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Stewart, 885
P.2d at 783 (quotations omitted).14 This Court has stated that under this doctrine it
determines whether a legal action "vindicated fa strong or societally important
public policy;' whether 'the necessary costs in doing so transcend[ed] [Plaintiffs']
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization;' and whether this case is
exceptional such that an award of fees is appropriate under the private attorney
general doctrine." Culbertson, 2008 UT App. 22, at If 10 (quoting Utahns for
Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97, f 5, 175 P.3d
1036).
Under the first of these factors, vindication of a strong or societally
important public policy, this Court has found that the requirement is met when an
action is brought not only to protect a party's property, "but also to require

14

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that when an issue is presented to an
appellate court, "an issue need not [first] be presented to an administrative agency
if it cannot properly decide the issue." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 781. The Board
cannot award attorney's fees or costs. Procedures I, C, Appendix 2.
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[government] . . . to abide by its own ordinances . . . Such motivation serves the
important public policy of 'ensuring] that [government is] . . . governed by the
rule of law, not of man.'" Culbertson, 2008 UT App 22 at ^ 12 (quoting Fox v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)). This Court
noted that, as in this case, a private action can serve to curb government's "willful
disregard of its own ordinances and procedures[,]" and to prevent government
officials from "willfully disregarding . . . ordinances to obtain their own economic
advantage." Id. at ^ 13 and 14. This is particularly important where a party has
sought "to resolve this issue without litigation, yet their efforts were rebuffed." Id.
at ^ 15. A private legal action benefits "a large number of citizens" when it forces
government "to abide by the rule of law when no other avenue toward that end had
been successful." Id. at ^f 15
Ho wick's action serves such a purpose, and vindicates an important public
policy. It demonstrates that cities cannot disregard legislative limitations on their
powers and violate the law. "All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted are
void." ). "[T]he exercise of a [City's] delegated power is subject to the
limitations imposed by state statutes and state and federal constitutions." Harding
v. Alpine City, 656 P.2d at 986. Further, the court has "a duty to invalidate" acts
that exceed a city's powers. Lorenc, 789 P.2d at 49.
Howick's case also vindicates important public policies regarding
employment. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an employee's property
right to work and receive compensation for work is "one of the most important of
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the liberties vouched safe to one in our society. It was so regarded by the framers
of our state constitution. Article XII, § 19." Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561,
563 (Utah 1953). The court declared that these rights "are of paramount
importance and that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree
consistent with the public good." Id. Further, cities have an "obligation to comply
with the statutory provisions . . . [in their policies and in] dealing with employees,"
and employees have the "right to expect" that they will. Thurston, 892 P.2d at
1038.
Further, Howick's action vindicates important public policies requiring that
the City provide due process. Consistent with the first factor in Culbertson,
Howick sought to discuss the illegal nature of the City's termination action with
the City Attorney several times but was rebuffed in her efforts. She then sought to
use the City's administrative process to address this matter, but the Board's staff
refused to provide Howick access to that process despite the clear requirements of
the Board's own Procedures. See Procedures III, G, Appendix 2. After this Court
pointed out this clear violation,15 Howick's Notice of Appeal was given to the
Board. However, Howick's participation in the appeal was limited to submitting
written documentation of her position. The Board sought and obtained a legal
opinion, which failed to address Howick's legal contentions. Nevertheless, three
Board members met and adopted that opinion in a meeting lasting approximately

15

See. Howick, 2008 UT App 216.
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two minutes. As demonstrated in Section II above, the City denied Howick due
process at every step, both before and after the termination of her employment.
Under the second factor of Culbertson, the court examines whether the
necessary costs in pursuing this matter transcend Howick's pecuniary interest to
an extent requiring subsidization. This matter has created severe hardships for
Howick, yet this kind of harm is very difficult and expensive to remedy. An
employee must bring a challenge to vindicate these rights at a time when the
employee, who is without a job and therefore without an income, is least able to
pursue it. Raising a challenge creates severe stress and difficulty for the employee
and places at risk the employee's ability to return to the workplace or find other
employment. Meanwhile, the City is free to continue to insist on illegal action
without suffering similar impacts, and with adequate funding to draw out the
process and escalate its difficulties.
Further, Howick's position is one of numerous City positions that are
subject to an illegal at-will designation, and thus Howick's action will benefit
similarly situated employees and act as a deterrent to future illegal City actions.
The City's Unclassified Compensation Plan, which has now been combined with
the City's Executive Compensation Plan, was created to cover these illegally
classified positions, and these plans were drafted without regard for the statutory
provisions of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106.16 Meanwhile, employees seeking to

16

The City combined its Unclassified Compensation Plan and Executive
Compensation Plan in July of 2008. See supra note 2 at 5 and Appendix 3. The
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vindicate these important rights face strong financial and personal disincentives,
and the City's classifications, ordinances, policies, procedures, and contracts have
previously gone without challenge.17 This action will make it less likely that
municipal employees, including others at the City, will be subjected to illegal
classifications by their employers or be subjected to deliberately protracted and
improper processes if they seek to vindicate their rights.
Under the third factor in Culbertson, this case is extraordinary. Howick
sought to address obvious problems with the City's action without bringing any
legal action at all, but the City refused even to respond. Howick then sought to
resolve this matter through the legislatively-mandated administrative process,
which requires an appeal board to render a decision within fifteen days. In
new Executive Compensation Plan claims to apply to "Elected Officials and those
full-time City employees classified as 'Appointed' employees," which it defines to
be "'at-will' employees serving at the pleasure of the Mayor . . ." Executive
Compensation Plan, Section II, Appendix 3. The plan lists all of these positions in
Appendix A under Levels 001-017 and 097-099. That list not only appears to
contain numerous positions that do not comply with the requirements of Sections
10-3-1105 and 1106, it contains five levels which state "Appointments Pending"
rather than designating existing positions. It thus appears that the City has
retained and intends to include even more illegally classified positions in its newly
revised plan despite the fact that when the City adopted this compensation plan in
July 2008, Howick had been pointing out the illegal nature of the City's
classifications for nearly a year.
17

The City's newly combined Executive Compensation Plan makes it even less
feasible for an employee to challenge the City's illegal classifications. In Section
XVI of the plan, the City provides for severance pay for "appointed employees"
who are terminated without cause, but only if they "execute a release of all claims
approved by the City Attorney's Office." Executive Compensation Plan,
Appendix 3. Employees thus must choose between challenging an illegal
classification, or receiving severance income after losing their jobs.
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response, the City willfully disregarded its own requirements and State law by
denying Ho wick access to the Board. Once this Court pointed out the City's
violation, the City then provided for a meaningless process designed to return the
matter to this Court.
The Legislature mandates a speedy and cost-effective process for
determining these disputes affecting the property rights and income of municipal
employees, but the City's deliberate actions have instead forced Ho wick to incur
many tens of thousands of dollars in expense and to spend over a year pursuing a
vindication of her rights. The City made a deliberate choice to engage in
protracted litigation in an effort to waste Howick's resources and coerce her
acceptance of the City's wrongful actions, and these choices were made by the
City Attorney and management personnel at the highest levels. The City was
unwilling "to respond in a meaningful way to [Howick's] prelitigation claims and
its engagement in this protracted litigation distinguishes this case from the run of
the mill dispute between a public entity and members of the public." Culbertson,
2008 UT App at If 18. Howick thus has met this Court's three factors, and is
entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.18

Howick is prepared to submit to this Court an affidavit of attorney fees and
costs incurred in connection with seeking review of the decision to terminate her
employment and vindication of statutory and constitutional rights. When this
Court has original jurisdiction of a matter, it has referred factual issues to the
District Court for appropriate proceedings. See Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons,
808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991).
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B.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HOWICK UNDER ITS INHERENT POWER IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY BASED ON ACTS BY
THE CITY IN BAD FAITH, VEXATIOUSLY, WANTONLY
OR FOR OPPRESSIVE REASONS.

Under this Court's equitable powers, it may also award attorney fees when
a party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (citing James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). Stewart does not define bad faith, but cases in other
contexts offer guidance. In defining bad faith in a statutory context, the court held
that these terms imply action that is willful or dishonest, involves "some motive of
self-interest," or involves a "deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a
belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect — that is to say, where
there is an intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears." Research
Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
In defining bad faith in the analogous context of awarding attorneys fees
under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-825, the Utah Supreme Court has defined good faith
as "(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent
to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of
the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others." Still
Standing Stable, LLC, v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, f 12, 122 P.3d 556 (quoting In Re:
Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 Utah 3, ]f 48, 86 P.3d 712. When any one of
these factors is lacking a party has acted in bad faith. Id.
40

The facts of this case demonstrate conduct that it is in bad faith, vexatious,
wanton and for oppressive reasons. The City's actions show a "deliberate desire
to evade knowledge" and to "close its eyes" as the City Attorney and the City
Labor Relations Officer repeatedly rebuffed Howick's requests to examine the
law. See Research Planning, Inc., 690 P.2d at 1132. The City could not have had
"an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question" when, among other
things, the City Attorney refused to examine the law, the original Labor Relations
Officer obtained Howick's job description rather than following the Board's own
Procedures, and the acting Labor Relations Officer also refused to follow the
Board's Procedures and circumvented the jurisdiction of this Court. See Still
Standing Stable, LLC, 2005 UT 46 at If 12.
These actions further demonstrate an intent to "take unconscionable
advantage of others[,]" and that the City had a knowledge and intent of activities
that would "hinder, delay or defraud others." Id. at ^ 12. Both State statute and
City procedures require an expedited process of fifteen days when an employee
appeals to the Board.19 Yet the City refused to comply with the law, and through
its deliberate efforts to create delay, it greatly increased the time and expense
necessary for Howick to obtain a review and decision.
The City took these actions despite the fact that the courts have recognized
the significance of determining public employment rights. The Utah Supreme
19

See Section 10-3-1106(3)(a), (3)(b)(i) and (ii), and (5)(a)(i) and (ii). See also
Procedures III, F; III G; and IV, A, Appendix 2.
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Court noted that employment property rights "are of paramount importance and
that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree consistent with the
public good." Backman, 263 P.2d at 563.
The City also acted despite the fact that the courts have recognized the
hardships associated with improper employment actions. Terminated employees
are in a "particularly vulnerable position." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828,
840 (Utah 1992). The employee may be subjected to a "lengthy wait for
vindication, and to the attendant and often traumatic disruptions to his personal
and economic life." Loudermill 470 U.S. at 549 (J. Marshall concurrence).
"During this period the employee is left in limbo[.]" Id, It is "in no respect
certain" that even a prompt post-deprivation hearing will make him or her whole "the wrongfully discharged employee will almost inevitably suffer irreparable
injury." Id at 550. "Of perhaps equal concern, the personal trauma experienced
during the long months in which the employee awaits decision, during which he
suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an opportunity to perform work, will
never be recompensed, and indeed probably could not be with dollars alone." Id
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the effects of an arbitrary
termination are "far-reaching and drastic" on the lives of "capable and faithful
public employees who have given many years to a particular job." Backman, 263
P.2d at 564.
The City's actions in this case are egregious, and they constitute conduct
that is in bad faith, vexatious, wanton or for oppressive reasons. These actions
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have imposed severe hardship and expense on Howick, and have created the very
hazards that Utah courts and the United States Supreme Court have spoken against
so strongly. The City pursued this course despite the fiduciary nature of its
obligations to comply with the law and properly administer employment rights,
including through the City's Board process. Therefore, the City's actions meet the
test stated in Stewart, and this Court should exercise its inherent equitable power
and award attorney fees to Howick.
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO
HOWICK UNDER THE DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution also provides for the
award of attorney fees in this appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has found that the
Due Process Clause of Article I, § 7 is self-executing, and that "self-executing
constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages." Spackman, 2000
UT 87 at ^ 19 (quotations ommitted). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
"judicial tradition gives [a court] the authority to do this under appropriate
circumstances." Id. at 1f 21. See also Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, f 22, 184
P.3d 592 (stating that in Spackman the Supreme Court "noted that the common
law gives the judiciary authority to provide civil remedies for constitutional
violations under appropriate circumstances.")
The court in Spackman stated that in a tort suit for damages three elements
must be established, and those elements may be applied here. "First, a plaintiff
must establish that he or she suffered a 'flagrant' violation of his or her
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constitutional rights." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at ^f 23. As discussed in Section II
of this Brief, Ho wick suffered a flagrant violation of her constitutional rights to
receive due process of law under the U.S. Constitution and under Article I, § 7 of
the Utah Constitution. The City's actions twice deliberately denied due process to
Howick despite the requirements of Section 10-3-1106 and the City's own
Procedures mandating a fast and cost-effective process. As a result, Howick was
instead forced to pursue an expensive and lengthy process to obtain a fair review.
This Court has stated that the City's actions were not permitted by its own
Procedures and that they circumvented judicial review. Howick, 2008 UT App
216.
The Spackman court stated that "[s]econd, a plaintiff must establish that
existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at ^
24. This appeal is not a suit for damages. The remedy available in this appeal is
reinstatement, but Howick has incurred many tens of thousands of dollars in legal
fees and expenses due to the City's illegal actions. The existing remedy does not
redress Howick's injuries; if she is reinstated, she will have to spend a substantial
portion of her annual government salary to pay expenses that the City illegally
forced her to incur. The harm is not remedied in this case if Howick retains her
job, but at a cost she can ill afford.
Finally, the Spackman court stated that "[t]hird, a plaintiff must establish
that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect
the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her injuries." Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at
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f 25. As discussed in the foregoing paragraph, restoring Howick's job does not
make her whole if she must incur the cost of correcting the City's deliberate and
illegal conduct. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the constitutional rights that
individuals hold in their employment under the Utah Constitution include "[t]he
right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, [and] the right to receive
compensation for one's work..." Backman, 263 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis
added). Non-monetary equitable relief alone will be wholly inadequate to protect
Howick's constitutional rights in her employment under the Utah Constitution,
including her right to receive compensation for her work.
The Utah Supreme Court has not limited an award of damages for a
violation of Utah's constitutional due process requirements to cases arising in a
particular forum. The Court stated that these damages may be awarded in
"appropriate circumstances" at a court's discretion. Under this flexible standard,
damages may be applied to a matter arising before an appeal board that must be
appealed to this Court due to a flagrant denial of due process. Howick's
circumstances meet the test established by the Utah Supreme Court to obtain an
award of attorney fees as damages under the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution, and this Court should award her attorney fees on that basis.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Howick was wrongfully terminated from her position as an attorney for Salt
Lake City solely on the basis of her allegedly at-will status in excess of the City's
statutory authority and in violation of the Utah Municipal code. Howick was also
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denied constitutionally mandated due process to protect her property interest in her
employment both before and after the termination of that employment, and by the
manner in which the City, its Board and staff conducted the proceedings. Howick
therefore requests that this Court:
1.

Reverse the decision of the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board

and reinstate her to her position in the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office because
she was a City employee entitled to the protections of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-31105 and 1106, and because her due process rights have been violated by the City
and the Board; and
2.

Award her attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with

seeking review of the decision to terminate her employment and vindication of
statutory and constitutional rights on the bases set forth in Section III above.
Dated this 3 ^

day of October, 2008.

AcArCVe!?^
Ehzabejh T. Dunning
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi Ho\
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3.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _ ^ J ) d a y of October, 2008, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners Brief was hand delivered to:
W. Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation

MJ.L C ~ " ^ ^ f l ^ ' ^ ^ ^
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APPENDIX 1

1 of 2 DOCUMENTS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15,
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
PART 11. PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007)
§ 10-3-1105. Municipal employees - Duration and termination of employment - Exceptions
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment without limitation of
time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department orfiredepartment who is a member of the classified civil service
in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to define cause for an
employee termination or reduction in force.
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 1.

1 of 1 DOCUMENT
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15,
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
PART 11. PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007)
§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer - Appeals - Board - Procedure
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involuntarily
transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred from
one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the
discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under
Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's rights
under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder
within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final disposition
of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary
transfer.
(b) (i) Upon the riling of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the
appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its
investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge,
suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;

(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days
from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5X&X9 to a maximum of 60 days, if
the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If itfindsin favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is dischaiBed or suspended without pay;
or
(ii) any deficiency in saiaiy for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less
remuneration.
(6) (a) Afinalaction or order of the appeal board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals byfilingwith that court a
notice of appeal.
(b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6Xa) shall befiledwithin 30 days after the issuance of thefinalaction or
order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the puipose of determining if the
appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal boaxxi, the number of members, the designation
of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Part 12, Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7Xa) may provide that the governing body of
the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-1106, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 2.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
Allrightsreserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. •**
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15,
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
PART 7. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS, AND PROCEDURE
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-702 (2007)
§ 10-3-702. Extent of power exercised by ordinance
The, governing body may pass any ordinance toiegulate, require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any activity,
business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other provision of law. An officer of the municipality shall not be
convicted of a criminal offense where he relied on or enforced an ordinance he reasonably believed to be a valid ordinance. It
shall be a defense to any acdon for punitive damages that the official acted in good faith in enforcing an ordinance or that he
enforced an ordinance on advice of legal counsel.
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-702, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 15,
2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
PART 8. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
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§ 10-3-815. Rules and regulations for administration of municipality
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of
this state, as it deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and business of the municipality.
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-815, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3.
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1221 (2007)
§ 10-3-1221. Municipal administrative code in council-mayor form
It shall also be the duty of thefirstmayor elected under the provisions of this part to draft and submit to the council, within
six months after assuming office, a proposed ordinance providing for the division of the administrative service of the
municipality into departments, divisions, and bureaus, and defining the functions and duties of each. Subsequent to the
adoption of this ordinance, upon recommendation of the mayor, the council by ordinance may create, consolidate, or abolish
departments, divisions, and bureaus and define or alter the functions and duties of each. The compilation of the ordinances
shall be known as the "municipal administrative code." Each officer shall have the power to prescribe rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with general law, the municipal administrative code, and the merit plan. Prior to the adoption of the
municipal administrative code, the mayor shall have power to establish temporary rules and regulations to ensure efficiency
and effectiveness in the divisions of the municipal government.
HISTORY: C. 1953,10-3-1221, enacted by L. 1977, ch. 48, § 3.

2.52.130 Discharge, Suspension Or Transfer:
In all cases where any employee, except: a) those employees set forth in section 10-3-1105
(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or its successor, and b) at-will employees, is discharged,
suspended for more than two (2) days without pay (2 shifts for employees who work shifts
longer than 8 hours), or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less
remuneration, the employee shall have the right to appeal such action in accordance with
sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or its successor. (Ord. 62-05
§ 2, 2005: prior code § 25-11-3)

2.53.020 Covered Employees And Applicants:
This chapter covers employment practices and decisions relating to Salt Lake City
government's classified career and civil service systems. "Classified career and civil service
systems" means those job positions in Salt Lake City government lawfully included in the
classified career and civil service, as defined in title 10, chapter 3 of the Utah Code Annotated,
the city ordinances and city policies enacted pursuant thereto. (Ord. 87-98 § 1, 1998)

2.53.030 Prohibited Employment Decisions And Practices:
A. Employment decisions and practices in Salt Lake City government's classified civil or career
service systems that are contrary to state or federal law are prohibited.
B. Employment decisions and practices in Salt Lake City's classified career service and civil
service system shall be based on job related criteria.
1. The term "job related criteria" as used in this chapter means those criteria necessary or
desirable to perform successfully the job held or sought. The term includes the personal
and professional attributes, qualifications, experience, character, interpersonal skills,
education and training, and those qualifications and skills identified in a written job
description.
2. The following are not "job related criteria" and shall not be used as a basis for an
employment decision or disciplinary action: a) the status of having a lifestyle which is
irrelevant to successful job performance; and b) the status of being in or outside of an adult
interpersonal relationship or a family relationship.
3. Nothing in this section shall prevent the city from taking disciplinary action with respect to
classified career service or civil service employees where there exists a reasonable nexus
between an act or failure to act that: a) adversely affects job performance; b) disrupts the
workplace; c) undermines the authority of management; d) impairs close working
relationships essential to the efficiency of the workplace; or e) otherwise impedes a safe,
efficient or effective work environment. (Ord. 87-98 § 1, 1998)

2.53.060 Remedies A n d Relief:
A. If there has been a violation of this chapter, corrective, curative, or preventive action shall
be taken to ensure that violations of this chapter, similar to those found, will not recur.
B. If an applicant for a position or an employee in the Salt Lake City government's classified
career and civil service systems has been the subject of an employment decision or
practice done in violation of this chapter, the applicant or employee shall be provided relief,
which may include the following:
1. The applicant may be offered the position the applicant would have occupied absent the
violation or, if justified by the circumstances, a substantially equivalent position, unless the
evidence indicates that the applicant would not have been selected even absent the
violation;
2. Cancellation of an unwarranted employment action;
3. Restoration of the employee to the position the employee would have occupied absent
the violation; and
4. Adverse matters relating to an employment decision or practice in violation of this
chapter shall be expunged from the applicant's or employee's personnel records. (Ord. 8798 §1,1998)

1,

General
1.1 Regular full-time employees are eligible for the City's benefits package, subject to the terms, conditions, and
limitations of each benefit program and specific employee elections.
1.2 Regular part-time employees are eligible for some benefits sponsored by Salt Lake City, subject to the terms,
conditions, and limitations of each benefit program and specific employee elections.
1.3

Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are selected through an open competitive process.

1.4 Part-time and seasonal employees and interns are only entitled to benefits required by federal, state, or
municipal law.
1.5 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are subject to a probationary period to determine if further
employment with the City is appropriate. The duration of the probationary period is designated when vacancies are
filled.
1.6 At their discretion, supervisors may extend probationary periods due to job cycle requirements or performance
problems or goals. Such extensions shall not exceed 60 days, and must be made in writing not later than 30 days
prior to the conclusion of the original probationary period. This provision does not apply to Civil Service
employees.
1.7 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are entitled to bidding rights as specified in memoranda of
understanding or Division of Human Resources procedures approved by the Attorney's Office.
1.8

1.9

At will positions are:
A.

Executive employees who report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director;

B.

Unclassified Employees;

C.

Part-time and seasonal employees; and,

D.

Regular employees who have not yet completed their probationary period.

Definitions:
A. Regular full-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 40 hours per week on a full-time
schedule.
B. Regular part-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 20 hours or more but less than 40
hours per week.
C.

Part-time or hourly: Employees whose positions require less than 20 hours per week.

D. Seasonal: Employees who work during a specific season equal to or less than eleven months in
duration defined by the department.
E. Intern: Students working for the City through a recognized university or college for a specified period
of time, as defined by the department.

F. Exempt/Non-exempt: Employees "exempt" or "non-exempt"fromthe payment of overtime in
accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.
G. Probationary period: The period of time that an employee serves as part of the hiring process before
career service or civil service status is granted to the employee. For career service employees this period is
180 days. For civil service employees, the length of probationary periods is determined by the Civil
Service Commission,
H. Telecommuting: A work arrangement in which the workplace is located, at least part of the time, at
an alternative location such as an employee's residence.
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S e c t i o n 1. [ I n h e r e n t a n d i n a l i e n a b l e rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of t h e i r consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for t h e abuse of t h a t
right.

S e c . 2. [All p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e p e o p l e . ]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have t h e right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare m a y require.
1896

S e c . 3. [ U t a h i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e U n i o n . ]
The S t a t e of U t a h is a n inseparable p a r t of the Federal
Union and t h e Constitution of the United States is t h e
supreme law of t h e land.
1896

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life a n d liberty, we, t h e people
f Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate t h e principles of
*ee government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUION.

1896

1896

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION O F RIGHTS
Bction
L. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in t h e people.]
J. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
t. [Religious liberty]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
>. [Right to bear arms.]
r
. [Due process of law.]
L [Offenses bailable.]
I. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
I. [Trial by jury.]
. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
I. [Rights of accused persons.]
i. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
. [Freedom of speech and of t h e press — Libel.]
. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
. [Treason defined — Proof.]
. [Military subordinate to t h e civil power.]
. [Slavery forbidden.]
. [Private property for public use.]
. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
. [Uniform operation of laws.]
. [Rights retained by people.]
[Provisions m a n d a t o r y and prohibitory.]

S e c . 4. [ R e l i g i o u s liberty.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall m a k e no law respecting a n establishment of religion or
prohibiting t h e free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public t r u s t or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or j u r o r on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate t h e State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for t h e support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
1999
S e c . 5. [ H a b e a s c o r p u s . ]
The privilege of t h e writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, t h e public
safety requires it.
1896
S e c . 6. [ R i g h t t o b e a r arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear a r m s for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or t h e
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; b u t nothing herein shall prevent t h e legislature
from defining t h e lawful use of a r m s .
1984 (2nd s.s.)
S e c . 7. [ D u e p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
S e c . 8. [Offenses b a i l a b l e . ]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support t h e new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by s t a t u t e as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and t h e court
finds by clear and convincing evidence t h a t the person
would constitute a substantial danger to a n y other person
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or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
>f
t h e court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
d
only as prescribed by law,
1988 (2nd S.S.).)

shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue but upoi
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing t(
be seized.
i8&

S e c . 9.

S e c . 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s — Libel.
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain t h e freedom o
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury; a n d if it shai
appear to the j u r y t h a t the m a t t e r charged as libelous is true
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends
the p a r t y shall be acquitted; and the j u r y shall have the righi
to determine the law and the fact.
189<

[ E x c e s s i v e bail a n d fines — Cruel p u n i s hL-"
ments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not^
be imposed; nor shall cruel and u n u s u a l punishments be®
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by j u r y shall remaina
inviolate. In capital cases the j u r y shall consist of twelveg
persons, and in all other felony cases, the j u r y shall consist of£
no fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, the Legislaturee
shall establish the number ofj u r o r s by statute, but in no eventf.
shall a j u r y consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases t h e verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of t h e jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c . 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury doneB
to h i m in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administeredI
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be*
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal ini
this S t a t e , by himself or counsel, a n y civil cause to which he is3
a party.

1896

S e c . 12. [ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s . ]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to3
a p p e a r and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the3
n a t u r e and cause of t h e accusation against him, to have a copy/
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel1
the a t t e n d a n c e of witnesses in his own behalf, to have at
speedy public trial by an impartial j u r y of the county orc
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and t h e right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall anyT
accused person, before final j u d g m e n t , be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against"
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against h e r
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice p u t in jeopardy for the s a m e offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminaryr
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to>
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by s t a t u t e . Nothing in this constitution shall preclude t h e use of reliable h e a r s a y evidence as defined by s t a t u t eJ
or rule in whole or in p a r t a t any preliminary examination to>
determine probable cause or a t a n y pretrial proceeding withL
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery isi
allowed as defined by s t a t u t e or rule.
1994\
Sec. 13.

[Prosecution by information or indictment —
G r a n d jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by t h e accused with t h e consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or withcSTsueli examination and commitment. The formation of the "grand j u r y and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by t h e Legislature. 1947
S e c . 14.

[Unreasonable s e a r c h e s forbidden — Issua n c e of w a r r a n t . ]
The right of t h e people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures

S e c . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — E x c e p t i o n . ]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases oi
absconding debtors.
ism
S e c . 17. [ E l e c t i o n s t o b e free — S o l d i e r s v o t i n g . ]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military
shall at any time interfere to prevent t h e free exercise of th€
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, m a y vote at theii
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
S e c . 18.

[Attainder — E x p o s t facto l a w s — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
189€

Sec. 19. [Treason denned — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying wai
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
S e c . 20. [Military s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
1896
S e c . 2 1 . [ S l a v e r y forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
p u n i s h m e n t for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
S e c . 22. [ P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c u s e . ]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation.
1896
S e c . 23. [ I r r e v o c a b l e f r a n c h i s e s f o r b i d d e n . ]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
privilege or immunity.

franchise,
1896

S e c . 24. [Uniform o p e r a t i o n of l a w s . ]
All laws of a general n a t u r e shall have uniform operation.
1896

S e c . 25. [ R i g h t s r e t a i n e d b y p e o p l e . ]
This e n u m e r a t i o n of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
S e c . 26. [ P r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t o r y a n d prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1896
S e c . 27. [ F u n d a m e n t a l rights.]
F r e q u e n t recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and t h e perpetuity of free
government.
1896
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Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) l b be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity,
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the
criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related
to the victim, either in person or t h r o u g h a lawful representative, once a criminal information or indictment
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and
(c) l b have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider,
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense except t h a t this subsection
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving
privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal
judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile
offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have t h e power to enforce and
define this section by statute.
1994
S e c . 29. [Marriage.]
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a m a n
and a woman.
(2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given t h e s a m e or substantially
equivalent legal effect.
2004
ARTICLE II
STATE BOUNDARIES

Section
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without t h e
consent of t h e United States and the people of this State:

[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is g u a r a n teed. No i n h a b i t a n t of this State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages a r e forever
prohibited.
1896
[Right t o p u b l i c d o m a i n d i s c l a i m e d — Taxation o f l a n d s
— Exemption.]
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and
declare t h a t they forever disclaim all right and title to t h e
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and t h a t until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, t h e s a m e
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of t h e United States.
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing
without this State shall never be taxed at a higher r a t e t h a n
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who
h a s severed his tribal relations, and h a s obtained from t h e
United States or from any person, by p a t e n t or other grant, a
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress,
containing a provision exempting the lands t h u s granted from
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided
in the act of Congress granting the same.
1945

Section
1. [State boundaries.]

[Territorial d e b t s a s s u m e d . ]
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of Utah,
incurred by authority of t h e Legislative Assembly thereof, a r e
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State.
1896

Section 1. [State boundaries.]

[Free nonsectarian schools.]

The boundaries of the State of U t a h shall be as follows:
Beginning at a point formed by t h e intersection of the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to t h e intersection of
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude;
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north latit u d e to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to t h e intersection of t h e same w i t h t h e thirty-second
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place
Df beginning.
1896
ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
Section
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] [Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]

Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for t h e establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which
shall be open to all t h e children of the State and be free from
sectarian control.
1896
ARTICLE IV
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section
1. [Equal political rights.]
2. [Qualifications to vote.]
3. [Voters — I m m u n i t y from arrest.]
4. [Voters — I m m u n i t y from militia d u t y ]
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.]
6. [Mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons, and cert a i n criminals ineligible to vote.]
7. [Property qualification forbidden.]
8. [Ballot to be secret.]
9. [General and special elections — Terms — Election of
local officers.]
10. [Oath of office.]

Section 1. [Equal political rights.]
The rights of citizens of the S t a t e of U t a h to vote and hold
office shall not be denied or -abridged on* account of sex. Both
male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges.
' 1896

APPENDIX 2

1.

Purpose & Background

A. These procedures establish the rules for:
1. the composition, nomination and election of the Employee Appeals Board;
2. the filing of appeals to the Employee Appeals Board;
3. the exercise of the Employee Appeals Board's authority, including conduct of hearings;
4. the standard of review applicable to matters heard by the Employee Appeals Board.
B. The Employee Appeals Board is created and functions under Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 &
1106 of the Utah Code, as such statutes may be amendedfromtime to time. The Board has authority to
investigate, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter that relates to the cause
for an employee discharge, suspension without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who
work shifts longer than 8 hours) or involuntary transfer from one position to another with less
remuneration.
C. The Board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters. The Board has no
authority to award attorney's fees or costs to either party. Additionally, the Board has no authority to
determine the City's legal liability under federal or state law.
D. Any City officer or employee to which these procedures apply may appeal a discharge, suspension
without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than 8 hours) or
involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, to the Employee Appeals
Board.
E.

These procedures shall apply to each employee of the City, except the following employees:
1. an officer appointed by the Mayor or the Mayor's designee;
2. a member of the police department or fire department who is a member of the classified
civil service;
3. a police chief;
4.
a deputy police chief;
5. a fire chief;
6. a deputy or assistantfirechief;
7. a head of a City department;
8. a deputy of a head of a City department;
9. a superintendent;
10.
a probationary employee;
11. an hourly part-time employee;
12. seasonal employee; or
13. any other at-will employee

F. The City labor relations officer in the Management Services Department is responsible for
coordinating with the applicable departments that will conduct nominations and elections for elected
Board members, coordinating with the Mayor regarding appointments to the pool of appointed Board
members, impaneling an Employee Appeals Board from die pool of appointed and elected Board
members to hear each appeal and providing staff support to the Employee Appeals Board. The City
Attorney shall train and advise the City labor relations officer in all matters relating to the Board's
authority and due process.

G. As required by Utah Code, the Employee Appeals Board must certify its decision to the City
Recorder withinfifteen(15) business days after the Board receives an appeal, unless for good cause the
Board extends the fifteen (15) day period up to a maximum of 60 calendar days, with the consent of the
employee and the City. The following procedures are necessary to assure the Board can effectively
render its decision within the statutorily required time.

II.

Board Members Selection Procedures

A. The City shall establish a pool of Board members, which shall include fourteen (14) persons: 4
appointed members and 10 elected members (elected members shall consist of five 100/200 series
employees and five 300/600 series employees).
1. Appointed Board Members. The Mayor shall appoint four (4) persons to serve on the
Board. The next appointment process shall begin in sufficient time for new Board members to be
in place by October 1,2005. The terms of appointed persons serving on the Employee Appeals
Board shall be three years and shall begin upon the date of the person's appointment. In the event
of a vacancy created by the resignation of an appointed person or by termination for cause, the
Mayor may appoint a new person to fill the remaining term of the person who resigned or was
otherwise removedfromthe Board.
2. Elected Board Members. The pool of elected Board members shall consist of one (1)
100/200 series employee and one (1) 300/600 series employeefromeach of the following
departments: (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public Utilities, (4) Community
Development, and (5) Management Services and other areas or divisions not included in the
other four departments listed.
a. Every three years the (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public
Utilities (4) Community Development and (5) Management Services (including all other
areas and divisions not enumerated above except Police and Fire) shall solicit
nominations of employees within the respective department or area and conduct elections
for the pool of elected Employee Appeals Board members. Nominations must be open
for a minimum often (10) days. Nominees must be full-time City employees.
b. At least one and no more than five (5) 100/200 series employees and at least one and
no more than five (5) 300/600 series employeesfromeach of the respective departments
set forth above shall be included on the list of nominees on the election ballot
c. In the event more than 5 nominations are received in any department listed above for
each of the two employee groups (100/200 and 300/600), the department may conduct a
preliminary election within such department to limit the number of nominees as set forth
in paragraph 2.b, above.
d. After nominees are identified, the respective departments shall conduct elections.
The election shall be by secret ballot. Each City employee or officer in each of the
departments shall be entitled to cast two votes for nominees in their own department: one
vote for a 100/200 series nominee and another vote for a 300/600 series nominee. City
employees and officers who are not in the Department of Airports, Public Services,
Community Development, Public Utilities, Police Department or Fire Department shall
be entitled to vote on nominees in Management Services. One 100/200 series nominee
and one 300/600 series nominee with the most votesfromeach department shall
comprise the pool of elected persons for the Employee Appeals Board. In case of a tie in
any department, the Mayor shall cast the deciding vote.

e. Elected Board members shall serve for three year terms, except for any person
who fills the remaining term of a person who has resigned or otherwise been removed
from the Board. The next nomination period shall begin in sufficient time for new Board
members to be in place by October 1,2005. Every three years thereafter, the respective

departments shall conduct elections in sufficient time for .the terms of elected Board
members to begin on October 1 of the year in which they are elected.
f. If a an elected Board member resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board, the
remaining elected Board members shall promptly meet and elect, by majority vote,
another personfromthe same department and employee classification series (100/200 or
300/600) as the departing Board member to fill the remaining term of the person who
resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board. The City labor relations officer shall
assist the Board members to develop a list of nominees.
B.

The Mayor or the Mayor's designee may remove any Board member for cause.

HI,

Appeal Filing Process

A. Any City officer or employee to whom these procedures apply may appeal a discharge,
suspension without pay for more than two (2) days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than
8 hours) or an involuntary transferfromone position to another with less remuneration to the Employee
Appeals Board. All requests for appeals must be in writing, addressed to the City Recorder and filed
with the City Recorder within the time limitations contained in these procedures.
B. The notice of appeal shall be in writing and filed before the close of the tenth business day
following the employee's receipt of a written decision by the employee's department head effecting or
upholding the disciplinary action at issue. The notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant
employee, or by his or her attorney or representative.
C. The Notice of Appeal shall be in the form or contain the information as set forth in Appendix
"A." The form is available at the City Attorney's Office, the City Human Resources office or online at
the City's website. The Notice of Appeal must (a) set forth with specificity any issue the employee
raised in the appeal before the department head and which the employee intends to raise on appeal to
the Board (the employee may not raise any issues before the Board that were not raised in the appeal
before the department head); (b) include copies of any documents the employee intends to introduce at
the hearing.
D. To be considered by the Employee Appeals Board, the Notice of Appeal must be filed in the
Office of the City Recorder within the time limit specified. The Board has no authority or jurisdiction to
hear an appeal that is filed beyond the time limits specified in this procedure or filed anywhere other
than with the Office of the City Recorder.
E. The Office of the City Recorder is located in Room 415, City & County Building, 451 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
F. Upon receipt of a written appeal, the City Recorder shall immediately provide a copy of the
appeal to the City labor relations officer and to the City Attorney.
G. If there is a question whether a City employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a
discharge, suspension or transfer, the Board shall request an opinion from the City Attorney regarding
that issue. The City Attorney shall render an opinion no later than the next business day after a request is
received.
H. Any person who voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the City may not appeal his or
her release from employment to the Employee Appeals Board.

IV,

Impaneling a Board for each Appeal

A. When an employee files an appeal, the City labor relations officer shall impanel a Board to hear
such appealfromthe pool of Employee Appeals Board members. Each such Board shall consist of five
(5) members.
B. The City labor relations officer shall impanel members for each appeal who are least likely to
have personal knowledge of the cause for the appellant's discharge, suspension or transfer. The City
labor relations officer shall designate one of the Board members as the Chairperson for the subject
appeal and notify that member of his or her designation. At the same time the Board members and the
Chairperson receive their notification, the City labor relations officer shall notify the department head of
each impaneled Board member. The notification to the respective department heads shall state that the
duties of the Board member take precedence over all other duties.
C. As soon as reasonably possible after the labor relations officer receives the appeal, the labor
relations officer shall notify the appellant, the affected City department, the Board members, and the
City Attorney of the date, time, and location the Board will hear the appeal While the labor relations
officer may consider requestsfromeither party for a particular hearing date, the availability of the Board
members and other requirements imposed by law will constrain the ability of the Board to accommodate
the parties.
D. Board members shall receive no additional compensation or benefits beyond their City salary or
wages for their service as Board members. However, Board members who are Fair Labor Standards Act
non-exempt employees shall be paid their regular rate of pay for time worked for their duties and such
time worked shall be considered in determining the City's overtime liability during the work weeks in
which the employee serves as a Board member.

V,

Appellant's Rights on Appeal

A. An appellant may be represented by any person of his or her choice to act as an advocate at any
level of the appeal procedure.
B. An appellant may request City employees and other persons to appear as witnesses during the
appeal proceedings and may present any relevant information in mitigation. Such witnesses and
information must relate directly to (1) the cause for the action taken, as set forth in the disciplinary
decision letter, and (2) any issues raised by either party at the proceeding before the department head.
C. An appellant may cross-examine any witnesses called by the City department during the appeal
proceedings. An appellant may inspect documents offered by the City department and may offer
evidence in explanation and rebuttal.
D. No City employee may take any reprisals against anyone who participates in an appeal proceeding
under this procedure.
E. If the Employee Appeals Boardfindsin favor of the employee, the next business day after the
Board's decision is certified to the City Recorder an employee who has been discharged or involuntarily
transferred to a position of less remuneration shall be restored to his or her former position; The
employee shall receive the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged, or suspended without pay, or any deficiency in salary for the period during which the
employee was transferred to a position of less remuneration.

VI,

Pre-hearing Procedures

A. The appellant employee or City department may file with the Board prior to the hearing any
relevant documents or written arguments that directly relate to (1) the cause for the discharge or transfer
as set forth in the disciplinary decision letter, and (2) any issues raised at the appeal to the department
head.. In case of such a filing, the appellant or City department shall make six copies of such documents
or written arguments for the Board and one copy for the other party to the proceeding. The six copies of
relevant documents or written arguments for the Board shall be filed with the City labor relations
officer. The party filing such documents or written arguments shall provide a copy of such documents or
written arguments to the other party to the proceeding the same day as any filing with the Board.
B. In each case of the filing of relevant documents or written arguments, the City labor relations
officer shall immediately distribute one copy of such materials to each impaneled Board member. The
City labor relations officer shall request that each member take any necessary work time to read and
review any materials. The City labor relations officer shall request that the department head of each
Board member authorize work time for Board members to review materials received.
C. At any time prior to the hearing, the Board Chair may meet with the parties in a pre-hearing
conference. The pre-hearing conference is intended as a mechanism to expedite the proceeding and will
not be used to stall or unnecessarily delay the hearing process. At the discretion of the Board Chair, the
pre-hearing conference may be conducted telephonically. At the conference, the Board Chair may
require the parties to submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and documents that each party intends to offer
in evidence; submit a joint statement detailing stipulated facts not in dispute; submit a joint statement
narrowing the matters for consideration by the Board; and make other orders to facilitate an efficient
and effective hearing. The pre-hearing conference is informal and not open to the public. Submissions of
required information from the pre-hearing conference shall be to the City labor relations officer,
D. The Board has no legal authority to issue subpoenas. If a party to the proceeding requests that
certain information or persons be subpoenaed, the Board shall request the Office of the City Attorney to
issue the subject subpoena. The Board has the authority to quash any subpoena issued by the City
Attorney or issued by any other office or authority regarding matters that are pending before the Board.
E. The Board has the authority to direct the participation or attendance of any City employee in the
Board's proceedings. Any employee who fails to comply with a Board directive to participate or attend
a Board proceeding shall be subject to discipline as determined by the employee's department head.

VH.

Hearing Procedures

A. The City labor relations officer shall employ a court reporter to record the hearing and prepare an
official transcript of the hearing. The official transcript of the hearing and all exhibits, written
arguments, and other evidence received by the Board shall be the official record of the Employee
Appeals Board proceeding.
B. Board hearings are considered open meetings under Utah law. The Board may close a hearing by
complying with the procedures and requirements of Utah Code Annotated Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and
Public Meetings.
C. Board hearings are not judicial or quasi-judicial process. They shall, hovvever, be conducted with
appropriate formality and decorum so that the due processrightsof all parties are protected and the
Board may perform its function. Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are used as
guidelines in the conduct of Board hearings, but are not strictly followed or applied. The Board shall not
strictly apply rules of evidence regarding authentication, foundation, or hearsay.
D. Upon motion of either party, the Board may invoke the exclusionary rule for witnesses. However,
one department representative of the City's choice will be allowed to remain present at all times.
E. The City labor relations officer will serve as procedural advisor to the Board and will assist the
Board in maintaining order in the proceedings.
F.

Unless the Board Chair rules otherwise for good cause, the hearing should proceed as follows:
1. The Board Chair opens the hearing and asks if the parties are ready. The Board Chair may
ask that a summary of any pre-hearing proceedings or activity be placed in the record.
2. Each party makes an opening statement. The City department makes its opening statement
first.
3. The City department presents evidence. The representative of the City department asks the
witnesses questions. After the City representative has questioned each witness, the employee or
the representative for the employee is entitled to cross-examine the witness. After crossexamination, the City may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination,
4. After the City department has presented its evidence, the employee or employee's
representative calls witnesses and presents evidence. After the employee or the employee's
representative has questioned each witness, the representative of the City department is entitled
to cross-examine the witness. After cross-examination, the employee or representative for the
employee may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination.
5. After all witnesses and evidence have been presented, each party makes a closing statement.
Ordinarily, the City department makes its closing statement first The employee or employee
representative makes his/her statement next. The City is then entitled to make a final statement to
discuss any issues raised in the closing statement of the employee or employee's representative.

6. After the closing statements, the Board Chair thanks everyone and closes the hearing so the
Board may consider the matter.
G, Following the hearing, the Board shall meet in a duly noticed, closed meeting to deliberate and
reach a decision. The ruling of the Board shall be based on a majority vote of the members. The Board
may only uphold or overturn the decision of the Department. The Board may not modify the decision of
the Department. The Board shall vote by secret ballot using the following standard of review:
1. Do the facts support the need for discipline or, in the case of a non-disciplinary discharge,
the need for remedial action to be taken by the department head? In other words, was action
warranted? If the City's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the decision should be upheld, even though the Board may have weighed the evidence
differently had it been in the department head's position. In order to overturn a disciplinary
action, the Board must have a definite andfirmconviction that the department head's decision
was clearly erroneous.
In an appeal where an employee was discharged, not for disciplinary reasons but because the
employee was no longer able or qualified to do the job, the Board's analysis shall end with the
analysis set forth in subsection 1, above. However, in an appeal of a disciplinary action the
Board shall proceed to step 2 of the analysis, as set forth below,
2. In a disciplinary action, if the facts support the need for discipline, is the action taken
proportionate to the discipline imposed? Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within
the discretion of the department head Unless the Board finds the discipline imposed is so harsh
as to constitute an abuse, rather than an exercise of the department head's discretion, the decision
of the department head should be upheld.

Vlll.

Board Decision

After fully hearing the matter on appeal, the Board shall certify its decision with the City Recorder
withinfifteen(15) business days after receipt of the appeal. For good cause, the Board may extend the
15-day period to a maximum of sixty (60) days, with the consent of the employee and the City. The
Board shall set forthfindingsof fact and conclusions based on such findings regarding the issues to be
decided by the Board, as set forth above in paragraph VII, G. 1 and 2. The Board Chair may sign the
decision on behalf of the Board. The decision shall be addressed to the appellant, with copies to the head
of the City department that took the action that was appealed. The City labor relations officer will
assure that copies of the certified decision are served on the appellant and on the affected department
head.
Revised October 17,2005 (Major revision to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106,
and to revise board composition and processes )
References: Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106
Salt Lake City Code 2.52.130,2.24.010
Memoranda of Understanding with Employee Organizations
Grievance Procedure for 300, 600 and 700 Series Employees
Policy 3.02.04 Employee Appeals and Grievances
Notice of Appeal Before Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF APPEAL
BEFORE
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD

NAME OF APPLICANT:
ADDRESS OF APPLICANT:

TELEPHONE:

WORK

HOME

DEPARTMENT:
ACTION BEING APPEALED:
Brief description of action (discharge, suspension, demotion):
Date of action being appealed:
Person who took action:
APPELLANT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY:
SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL (attach additional pages if necessaiy):

WITNESSES YOU MAY HAVE TESTIFY APPEAL (attach additional pages if necessary): :
Name:
Address:
Telephone:

Name:
Address:
Telephone:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
Page 1 o f 2
DOCUMENTS YOU INTEND TO INTRODUCE AT THE HEARING :

WHAT ACTON DO YOU WANT THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD TO TAKE:

I hereby request a hearing before the Employee Appeals Board.

Signature of Appellant

Date

APPENDIX 3

SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORT
BUDGET ANALYSIS

- FISCAL YEAR 2 0 0 8 - 0 9

DATE:

May 30, 2008

BUDGET FOR:

EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION - FISCAL YEAR 2008-09

STAFF REPORT BY:

Sylvia Richards

cc:

David Everitt, Lyn Creswell, Steve Fawcett, Sam Guevara, Vic
Blanton, Ralph Chamness

Budget Issues and Policy Changes
Proposed Changes to the Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and
Elected Officials
The Administration recommends the following:
A. One Compensation Plan for all Appointed Employees:
All executive and unclassified employees will be consolidated under one
compensation plan. With the exception of Justice Court Judges, these employees
are at will, meaning that their employment may be terminated without cause. The
title of the plan will be Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and Elected
Officials.
The Administration indicates this change will combine pay structures and create
more logical spacing between pay levels. The Justice Court Judges' positions and
high-level positions from the Airport and Public Utilities will be housed under this
plan. As a reminder, this group of employees does not have career protection and
is not represented by a collective bargaining agreement.
B.

Changes to Severance for Department Heads:
Changes to the severance policy have been recommended by the Administration.
Current department heads appointed after January 1, 2000 who terminated not
for cause and who signed a release of claims shall receive:
2 months of base salary pay after 1 full year of City employment;
4 months of base salary pay after 2 full years of City employment;
6 months of base salary pay after 3 full years of City employment;
The maximum severance for department heads is 6 months.

Other Proposed Compensation Plan Changes
A. Vacation allowance for Recruiting Appointed Employees and 300/600 Series
Employees:
The Administration indicates that during tight labor markets there have been
challenges recruiting for certain positions. As a recruiting incentive, the
Administration proposes to allow negotiation with prospective appointed or
1

professional employee candidates for u p to 120 h o u r s .
B.

Bereavement Policy (citywide):
The Administration h a s proposed to modify the Bereavement Policy a n d adopt
these changes for all employee groups in order to provide a more uniform
approach citywide. There were some inconsistencies in the policy from one plan to
another, such a s , t h e categories of 'grandfather-in-law a n d grandmother-in-law
were excluded from one of the plans. This item h a s been remedied. Also, the term
'domestic p a r t n e r ' w a s replaced with 'adult designee' in all of the plans.

C.

Sick a n d Other Related Leave or Personal Leave (proposed option of switching from
Plan A to Plan B) (citywide):
City employees who were hired on or before November 16, 1997 have the
opportunity of switching from Plan A to Plan B during a n y future city-established
enrollment periods at a conversion rate of 40 percent. The remaining 60 percent
of accumulated Plan A (Sick Leave) h o u r s are removed from t h e books.

D. Vacation Buyback Policy (citywide):
The Administration r e c o m m e n d s deleting the City's vacation buyback policy from
all compensation p l a n s . The Administration indicates t h a t the policy is difficult to
administer, a n d the Administration would prefer to encourage employees to take
their vacation time r a t h e r t h a n sell it back to the City.

Employee Groups
The City's employee pay s t r u c t u r e is a collection of pay grades, each with a pay range
or one or more pay steps. In the case of pay ranges, movement of the s t r u c t u r e does
not, in itself, create a salary change; it merely c h a n g e s the potential for pay
a d j u s t m e n t s . In contrast, a change in s t r u c t u r e containing grades with pay steps
e q u a t e s to a corresponding change in pay. The City h a s both k i n d s of s t r u c t u r e s :
ranges are provided for professional a n d appointed employees; steps are included in all
other employee groups.
Following are estimated pay raise costs (percentages) for Fiscal Year 2008-09,
a s s u m i n g all u n i o n c o n t r a c t s are settled a t a 2.7 percent Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA), p l u s merit increases (which occur on the employee's anniversary date).
1 0 0 Series (operations and m a i n t e n a n c e employees): The proposed ordinance
funds a one-year contract m e m o r a n d u m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g contract agreed to by the
City a n d the American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees Local 1004
(AFSCME).
•

2 . 7 % m a r k e t a d j u s t m e n t on J u n e 29, 2 0 0 8

•

. 4 5 % estimated Merit step cost increase

•

3 . 1 5 % total estimated cost increase

2 0 0 Series (technical and clerical employees): The proposed ordinance funds a
one-year m e m o r a n d u m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g contract agreed to by t h e City a n d the
American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees Local 1004 (AFSCME).
• 2.7% m a r k e t a d j u s t m e n t on J u n e 29, 2008
• 0.86% estimated Merit step cost increase
2

•

3,56% total estimated cost increase

400 Series (Fire Union):
The previously agreed upon ordinance approves a
memorandum of understanding between Salt Lake City and the Fire Fighters Local.
The term of agreement is for one year.
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008
• 1.28% estimated Merit step cost increase
• 3.98 total estimated cost increase
500 Series (Police Union): The ordinance approves a memorandum of understanding
between Salt Lake City and the International Union of Police Associations, Local 75,
AFL-CIO. The term of agreement is for one year.
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008
• 1.91% estimated Merit step cost increase
• 4.61% total estimated cost increase
3 0 0 / 6 0 0 Series (professional): Employees in the 300 series are subject to the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and receive overtime or
compensatory time for time worked over 40 hours per week. Employees in the 600
series are salaried and exempt from the FLSA provisions. There are 15 grades in the
300 series (301 to 315) and 15 in the 600 series (601 to 615), but these grades are not
steps to which employees advance. Each grade has a salary range that reflects the
normal growth potential.
The ordinance prepared for 300/600 Series compensation is not negotiated with a
bargaining unit. However, the Administration does work with a group of employee
representatives called the Professional Employees Council (PEC) to review the
implications of proposed changes.
•

2.7% structure increase and 2.7% general percentage increase (GPP

•

No Merit increases

•

3.87% total estimated cost increase

Previously, the Administration used a factoring system for calculating general pay
increases that provided a percentage increase greater than the GPI when an
employee's pre-increase salary was below the new midpoint, and an increase smaller
than the GPI when the employee's pre-increase salary was above the new midpoint.
This approach has been changed such that when an employee's pre-increase salary is
above the new midpoint, the increase will be no less than the GPI. In December of
2007, the Citizens Compensation Advisory Committee (CCAC) observed that some
private employers and most local public agencies do not use the 'deceleration-abovemidpoint" approach. The CCAC recommended that the City follow the practice of
other cities, and the Administration acted on this suggestion. The Administration
indicates that a majority of the City's employees in this plan are currently below the
midpoint. The Council may wish to ask about the short and long-term costs
associated with this change.

3

700 Series (regular part-time employees who perform essentially the same duties
of employees classified by the City as 100 and 200 series): Employees covered by
this compensation plan regularly work 20 or more hours per week but fewer than 40.
The plan does not apply to seasonal or temporary employees. Wages are the entry
level for the applicable job grouping. These employees receive 4 hours of pay for each
holiday. Vacation leave is granted at half of the amount £>t full-time employees. The
City contributes to the state retirement system for these employees. The ordinance
prepared for 700 Series compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit.
•
•

2.7% market adjustment beginning J u n e 29, 2008
No Merit steps

The Council has discussed the percentage of benefits paid for these part time
employees previously, and expressed that paying 50 percent of benefits for an
employee who the City may want to have work 75 percent of the time may not
be equitable. The Council has received a recommendation from the Citizens
Compensation Advisory Committee in support of leaving the benefit at 50
percent, but the Council could elect to make the policy decision to make two
tiers of benefits for this plan. The Council may wish to ask for a cost estimate
from the Administration for this approach.
It should be noted that the Mayor's recommended budget indicates a trend to
move seasonal employees to this plan, and provide benefits. The Council may
wish to ask regarding the degree to which the Administration anticipates shifting
the City's workforce, and the estimated cost as this is phased in.
800 Series (police sergeants, lieutenants, captains): The ordinance prepared for
800 Series compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit. However, the
Administration does work with a group of employee representatives (PEC and
sergeants, lieutenants and captains associations) to review the implications of
proposed changes.
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008.
• 0% estimated Merit step cost increase
• 2.7% total estimated cost increase
Employees in the 800 series appear to be presently at their top step, so little or no
merit step increase is anticipated.
9 0 0 Series (fire captain, battalion chief): The ordinance prepared for the 900 Series
compensation is not negotiated with a bargaining unit. However, the Administration
does work with a group of employee representatives (PEC) to review the implications of
proposed changes.
• 2.7% increase to base pay on June 29, 2008
• 0.23% estimated Merit step cost increase
• 2.93% total estimated cost increase
Most employees in the 900 series are presently at their top step, so merit or step
increase is minimal.
4

Appointed Employees (Includes employees currently classified as Executives and
employees currently occupying Unclassified positions): Unclassified employees
presently include Justice Court Judges, non-executive appointed staff in the Mayor's
Office, Council Office, City Attorney's Office, and administrative secretaries of
department directors. As mentioned on page one of this report, the Administration
has proposed to move all Appointed employees, including executives and unclassified
employees, to the Compensation Plan for Appointed Employees and Elected Officials.
Appointed employees are "at will" and subject to termination without cause.
Appointed employees' salaries become subject to midpoint control; midpoints increase
by 5.40% to 9.90% for department and division directors (currently classified as
"executives"). Base pay is limited to 110% of midpoint. A general percentage increase
of'2.7% is applied to new structure. Performance-based portion (if any) of pay increase
is not added to base salary.
•
•

4.28% total estimated cost increase
No Merit steps

Elected Officials:
In accordance with Resolution No. 70 of 1993, elected officials' salary for fiscal year
2009 is based in part on a national survey of capital cities having a Mayor-Council
form of government and populations in the 100,000 to 400,000 range. The Council
may wish to confirm interest in asking the CCAC to consider modifying the
methodology of selecting comparable cities for the national surveys for elected
officials.
•
•

Based on survey results, the increase is 0.8%
No merit steps
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I.

EFFECTIVE DATE
The provisions of this plan shall be effective commencing July 1,2008.

II, EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THIS PLAN
Employees subject to this plan shall be the Elected Officials and those full-time City employees
classified as "Appointed" employees. "Appointed" employees are appointed and, with the
exception of Justice Court Judges who are covered under this plan, are "at-will" employees
serving at the pleasure of the Mayor (or the City Council if they are employees of the Office of
the City Council). Employees are not covered by the paid leave provisions of this plan while
they are on unpaid leave of absence. However, employees on an unpaid military leave of
absence may be entitled to the restoration of certain leave benefits as provided by city ordinance.

WAGES AND SALARIES
A.

Elected Officials
The annual compensation of elected officials shall be as provided in APPENDIX "A."

B.

Appointed Employees
From June 29, 2008 to June 30,2009, Appointed employees shall be paid within ranges
provided in the schedule attached hereto as APPENDIX "B." Any performance-based
pay adjustment above the "Base Pay Maximum" of the range will be given as a
supplemental payment not added to base. In no case will such annual supplemental
payments when divided by 26 and added to the base pay adjustment3/^ allowed to
exceed the "Range Top."

C.

Other Forms of Compensation
The foregoing shall not restrict the Mayor or the City Council from distributing
appropriated moneys to employees of the City in the form of discretionary lump sum
supplemental performance-based or special supplemental payments to employees within
per annum pay limitations. The Mayor or the City Council may also grant a discretionary
retention incentive benefit, if one is necessary to meet employment market conditions or
where it would be in the City's best interests to do so.

XVI. SEVERANCE BENEFIT
A. Subject to availability of funds, current Appointed employees shall receive the following
severance benefit on termination of their employment:
1. Current Appointed Employees, Who Were Appointed Before January 1, 1989.
Current Appointed employees, who were appointed before January 1, 1989, shall
receive a severance benefit determined as follows:
a. Appointed employees who have an account, established by prior City
policy, and which was credited with a cash value equal to the total accrued sick
leave hours available to the employee on December 31, 1988, multiplied by said
employee's hourly rate of pay in effect on December 31, 1988, are vested in that
account. The hours included in this account are separately accounted for and are
not included in the "Plan B Retirement Benefit" under VIILE.8.a.
Upon the voluntary or involuntary termination of employment from the City,
these Appointed employees shall receive, at the time of separation, the cash value
of their vested account. However, Appointed employees, may, during their
employment, use the hours in that account for sick leave purposes, although such
use will reduce the cash value of the account.
b. Current Appointed employees, appointed before January 1, 1989, who are
terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the
City Attorney's Office, shall receive, as a severance benefit, in addition to
subparagraph A. 1 .a. above: One month's base salary pay, determined on the
effective date of termination, for each year of City employment calculated on a
pro-rata basis, not to exceed 6 months' base salary. This additional severance
benefit shall be provided only if the termination from City employment is
involuntary.
2. Current Appointed employees appointed on or after January L 1989 and before
January h 2000. who are terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all
claims approved by the City Attorney's Office, shall receive a severance benefit, but only
for an involuntary termination from City employment.
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: One month's base salary pay,
for each year of City employment before January 1, 2000, calculated on a pro-rata
basis, not to exceed 6 months' salary.
3. Current Department heads appointed on or after January 1. 2000 who are
terminated not for cause, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the City
Attorney's Office, shall receive a severance benefit, but only for an involuntary
termination from City employment.
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: Two months' base salary pay,
determined on the effective date of termination, after one full year of City
employment, four months' base salary pay after two full years of City
employment, or six months' base salary pay after three full years of City
employment.

4. Current Appointed employees who are not Department heads, and who were
appointed on or after January 1. 2000, who are terminated not for cause, and who
execute a release of all claims approved by the City Attorney's Office, shall receive a
severance benefit, but only for an involuntary termination from City employment.
The severance benefit for said employees shall be: One week's base salary pay,
determined on the effective date of termination, for each year of City employment
calculated on a pro-rata basis, not to exceed 6 weeks' base salary.

5. Current Appointed employees with leave hour account balances under Plan A or
Plan B, and who execute a release of all claims approved by the City Attorney's Office,
shall, in addition to the severance benefit provided under paragraph 1., or paragraph 2.,
or paragraph 3. in this section XVI. A., receive a severance benefit equal to the
"retirement benefit" value provided under section VIII. E. 4. or VIII.F.8, if separation is
involuntary and not for cause.
6. Not Eligible for Benefit. The severance benefit provided herein shall not be granted
to the following employees:
a. An employee who, at the time of termination of employment, has been
convicted, indicted, charged or is under active criminal investigation concerning a
public offense involving a felony or moral turpitude. This provision shall not
restrict the award of full severance benefits should such employee subsequently
be found not guilty of such charge or if the charges are otherwise dismissed.
b. An employee who has been terminated or asked for a resignation by the
Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer or Department Director under bona fide
charges of nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office.
c. An employee who fails to execute a Release of All Claims approved by the
City Attorney's Office, where required as stipulated above.
7. Replaces Retirement Election. An employee who elects and is paid a benefit by the
City pursuant to retirement election is not eligible to receive a severance benefit as
provided herein, except as provided under paragraph A.I.a. above.

XVII. AUTHORITY OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
Employees covered by this compensation plan may be appointed, classified, and advanced
under rules and regulations promulgated by the Mayor, the Civil Service Commission, or the
City Council, if applicable, within budget limitations established by the City Council.

APPENDIX A - ELECTED OFFICIALS SALARY SCHEDULE
Bi-Weekly Rates
July 29,2008
Mayor $4,390.19
Council Members $878.04

Mid

Top

098

$4,100.80

$5,325.60

$5,858.40

$6,550.00

097

$3,024.14

$4,320.20

$4,752.22

$5,616.26

001

$4,100.80

$5,325.60

$5,858.40

$6,550.40

002

$3,728.00

$4,841.60

$5,325.60

$5,955.20

003

$3,420.00

$4,441.60

$4,886.40

$5,463.20

004

$3,137.60

$4,075.20

$4,482.40

$5,012.00

005

$2,905.60

$3,773.60

$4,150.40

$4,640.80

006

$2,690.40

$3,493.60

$3,843.20

$4,297.60

007

$2,514.40

$3,264.80

$3,592.00

$4,016.00

008

$2,349.60

$3,051.20

$3,356.80

$3,753.60

009

$2,196.00

$2,852.00

$3,136.80

$3,508.00

010

$2,052.00

$2,665.60

$2,932.00

$3,278.40

011

$1,936.00

$2,514.40

$2,765.60

$3,092.80

012

$1,826.40

$2,372.00

$2,609.60

$2,917.60

013

$1,723.20

$2,237.60

$2,461.60

$2,752.80

014

$1,625.60

$2,11120

$2,322.40

$2,596.80

015

$1,533.60

$1,992.00

$2,191.20

$2,449.60

016

$1,446.40

$1,879.20

$2,067.20

$2,311.20

017

$1,364.80

$1,772.80

$1,949.60

$2,180.00

No position may be removed from or
added to this Appointed Employee Pay Plan
without approval of the City Council.

Level

001

002

003

Chief Administrative Officer

Chief of Staff

Public Services Deputy Director

Airport Engineering Director

City Attorney

Police Chief

Chief Information Officer

Airport Admin/Comm Director

Public Services Director

Communication Director

Redevelopment Director

Management Services Director

Senior Advisor - Mayor

City Council Deputy Director

Fire Chief

Finance Director

Appointed Sr. City Attorney

Deputy City Attorney

City Prosecutor

Airport Police Chief

City Council Office Exec
Director

Airport Operations Director

City Engineer

Airport Maintenance Director

Public Utilities Deputy Director

P. Util. Finance Administrator
Airport Finance/Acct Director
Information Mgt Serv Dir Airport

Level

004

005

006

007

Assistant Police Chief

P.S. Fin/Admin Serv Director

Sorensen Center Director

Public Policy Analyst

Planning Director

Building Official

Chief Procurement Officer

Const Liaison/Pub Pol Analyst

DCED Dep Director - Comm
Dev

HAND Director

City Courts Director

Community Facilitator

DCED Dep Director - Econ
Dev

Transportation Engineer

Airport PR/Marketing Director

Downtown Transp Dev Coord

City Treasurer

Public Utilities Chief Engineer

Comp Adm/EE Rel Coordinator

Emergency Mgt Program Dir

Human Resources Director

Civilian Review Bd Investigator

City Recorder

Deputy Fire Chief

Sustainability Director

Airport Plan/Cap Prog Dir

Assistant Planning Director

Wtr. Quality/Treat
Administrator
Dep City Eng/Major Projects

Level

008

009

Appointments Pending

Coord For Human Rights/Divers

Council Constituent Liaison

Assistant Communication Dir

Econ Dev Mgr Small Business

Assistant To Chief of Staff

Const Liaison/Budget Analyst

Youth City Programs Manager

Com Affairs/ADA Analyst

010

011

Community Liaison

Level

012
Appointments Pending

013
Assistant To The Mayor

014
Appointments Pending

015
Admin Asst To Office of Mayor

Administrative Assistant

Staff Assistant

Off Mgr/Mayor/Comm Affair

Admin Secretary II
Management Support
Coordinator
Coalition Coordinator
Executive Office Assistant

Level

016

017

Appointments Pending

Appointments Pending

097
Justice Court Judge

099
Executive Director Of Airports

098
Public Utilities Director
DCED Director

APPENDIX 4

Elizabeth T. Dunning, Esq., #3896
HOLME ROBERTS & OWENS
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263
(801) 521-5800
Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
Jodi Howick,
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 20070863
Salt Lake City Corporation,
Respondent.
PURSUANT TO RULE 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner
Jodi Howick ("Howick") submits this Docketing Statement.
1.

Nature of the proceeding. This appeal is from the final action or

order of Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") on the Notice of Appeal of her
termination filed by Howick before the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
on September 10, 2007.
2.

Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated § 10-3-1106(6).
3.

Relevant dates.
A.

September 21,2007.
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Date thefinaljudgment or order appealed from was entered:

B.

Date the notice of appeal or petition for review was filed:

October 22, 2007.
C.

(1) Date any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b) or

59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 were filed: None.
4.

Appellant is not an inmate.

5.

Rule 54(b), This appeal is not from an order in a multiple-party or

multiple-claim case in which the judgment had been certified as a final judgment
by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

This is not a criminal case.

7.

Issues on appeal. Howick intends to assert the following issue(s) on

appeal:
A.

Issue: Salt Lake City exceeded its statutory authority and

violated the Utah Municipal Code by attempting to create or creating at-will
positions not authorized by and contrary to the Utah Municipal Code and
terminating Howick's employment pursuant to such status.
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702,10-3-815,
10-3-1105, 10-3-1106 and 10-3-1221: University of Utah v. Shurtleff. 144P.3d
1109 (Utah 2006); Salt Lake City v. Sutter. 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923); Draughon v.
Dept. of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999); Lorenc v. Call
789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1989).
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Standard of Review: De novo review for correctness. Mouty
v. Sandy City, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah App. 2005).
B.

Issue: Salt Lake City violated the Utah Municipal Code and

its own ordinances, policies and procedures by denying Howick access to the
appeal process established for City employees to appeal termination decisions. To
the extent the City's policies and procedures are interpreted to create a class of
at-will employees who are not entitled to the protection of Utah Code Annotated §
10-3-1106 in addition to those identified by the Utah Municipal Code, they violate
the Utah Municipal Code.
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-702,10-3-815,
10-3-1105, 10-3-1106 and 10-3-1221; Salt Lake City Code §§ 2.53.030(a);
2.53.020; Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board Procedures; Carrier v. Salt
Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004); Draughon v. Dept. of Financial
Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1999).
Standard of review: De novo review for correctness. Mouty
v. Sandy City, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah App. 2005).
C.

Issue: Salt Lake City acting under color of state law violated

Howick's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and thereby violated 42 United States Code § 1983 and under Article
1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution by terminating her employment on an at-will basis
and denying her access to the appeal process established by the Utah Municipal
Code for City employees to appeal termination decisions.
3
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Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and
1106; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Spackman v. Bd.
of Educ. of Box Elder County School District 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000).
Standard of Review: De novo for correctness. Strawberry
Elec. Serv. Dist v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 1996).
d.

Issue: Howick is entitled to attorney's fees under the Court's

inherent power in the interest of justice and equity, under the due process
provisions of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and as
damages for her termination.
Determinative law: Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994); Lorenc v. Call 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1989); Heslop v.
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).
Standard of review: Within the Court's discretion. Stewart v.
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994); Prince v. Tooele County
Hous. Autlu 834 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1992).
8.

Factual summary. In 1998 the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office

purported to create a new at-will attorney position outside of the City's merit
system. Attorneys working in the Office were asked to agree to move to the
newly-created positions in exchange for a raise in pay. In August 2007, Howick's
employment was terminated without notice after 15 years of excellent
performance explicitly on the basis of her at will status and in fact for reasons that
violated the protections afforded to merit system employees pursuant to the Utah
4
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Municipal Code. Howick asked several times to meet with Salt Lake City to
discuss the basis of its action, but Salt Lake City refused to meet.
Howick then appealed her termination to the Salt Lake City Employee
Appeals Board in accordance with the Utah Municipal Code and Salt Lake City
Ordinances and Policies. Salt Lake City's Labor Relations Officer, who staffs the
City's Employee Appeals Board but has no substantive responsibilities in the
appeal process, refused to initiate the appeals process and wrote to Howick giving
the Labor Relations Officer's opinion that Howick was an at-will employee and
therefore not entitled to an appeal.
Howick contacted Salt Lake City pointing out that the Labor Relations
Officer's action was contrary to both state law and City Ordinance and Policy and
asked whether in spite of the unlawful nature of her action, the Labor Relations
Officer's letter would be certified as the final action of the Employee Appeals
Board as required by statute. At first Salt Lake City represented in writing that the
Labor Relations Officer's letter was not Salt Lake City's final action on Howick's
appeal of her termination. Three days later the City reversed its position and
informed Howick in writing that no further action would be taken on her appeal to
the Employee Appeals Board.
9.

Assignment. This appeal is not subject to transfer by the Supreme

Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4).
10.

Related appeals. There are no related appeals.

11.

Attachments. The following are attached:
5
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A.

The final order or action from which the appeal is taken:

letter of Jamey Knighton, Salt Lake City Labor Relations Officer, dated
September 21,2007, attached as Exhibit A.
B.

Correspondence from Howick requesting clarification of

whether Exhibit A constitutes the final decision of Salt Lake City, attached as
Exhibit B.
C.

Correspondence first denying and then confirming that

Exhibit A constitutes the final decision of Salt Lake City, attached as Exhibit C.
D.

Howick's Notice of Appeal to the Salt Lake City Employee

Appeal Board, filed with the Salt Lake City Recorder on September 10, 2007,
attached as Exhibit D.
E.

The Notice of Appeal to this Court attached as Exhibit E.

There are no orders extending the time for the filing of a notice of appeal.
F.

There is no notice of claim.

G.

There are no motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b),

54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6.
H.

Appellant is not an inmate.

Dated this 1 3 ^ ~ day of November, 2007.

Elikqbet^ T. Dunning, Esq.
Attorney of Record

#231528 vS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing Statement
was mailed by first class mail this \ Q

day of November, 2007, to the following:

Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

&®

7
#231528 v5

(LXJlMii*^

EXHIBIT A

JAMEY

S^Bf MM Qlfiff WBNSBSMBB

KNIGHTON

(IRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT
DIVISION OF HUMAN RESOURCE

R O S S C. " R O C K Y "

ANDERSON

MAYOR

SERVICES
MANAGEMENT

RECEIVED
September 21,2007

SEP 24 2007
Holme,
Roberts
&
Owen, LLP

VIA FAX (521-9639) and U.S. MAIL
Elizabeth T. Dunning
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2263
Re: Jodi Howick
Dear Ms. Dunning,
This letter is in response to the "Notice of Appeal before Salt Lake City Employee
Appeals Board" you filed on Jodi Howick's behalf. In my role as the Labor Relations
Office, I am responsible for the administration of the city's Employee Appeals Board
policy and procedures. The City's EAB procedures identify specific employee
classifications that are excluded from the right to appeal an employment action to the
EAB.
I have carefully reviewed the policies, procedures and ordinances that pertain to the
Employee Appeals Board and have determined the Employees Appeal Board does not
have jurisdiction to review the termination of appointed or at-will employees. Because
Ms. Howick was an Appointed Senior City Attorney, the appeals board does not have
jurisdiction to hear her appeal. As a result, the appeal will not be forwarded to a hearing
board.
Sincerely,

1(Pnu^j

/tW^
9

Jamey Knighton, SPHR; CCP
Director of Human Resources
Salt Lake City Corporation
cc: EdRutan

U T A H

QUALITY

A W A R D

1 9 9 5

4 5 1 S O U T H STATE S T R E E T , R O O M 1 1 5, SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H B 4 1 1 1
TELEPHONE: BD1-535-79QD

®

•

FAX: BD 1 - 5 3 5 - 6 6 1 A
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EXHIBIT B

Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
Attorneys at Law

SALT LAKE CITY

BOULDER

COLORADO SPRINGS

DENVER

SENT VIA FACSIMILE
AND U.S. MAIL
535-7640
September 2 8 , 2 0 0 7

Ralph E. Chamness
Salt Lake City Attorney's Office
451 South State, Suite 505A
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Re:

Jodi Howick

Dear Ralph:
LONDON

LOS ANGELES

MUNICH

SAN FRANCISCO

I received a brief letter from Jamey Knighton, Director of Human Resources,
on September 21,2007, informing me that, acting in her position as labor
relations officer, she has determined that the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals
Board does not have jurisdiction to review Ms. Howick's appeal of her
discharge. Ms. Knighton's letter raises serious concerns.
Under the Employee Appeals Board Procedures ("Procedures"), the City labor
relations officer's duties are limited to coordinating the election and
appointment of Employee Appeals Board members and providing staff support
to the Board. See Procedures, Section I.F. Under Section IILG of the
Procedures, the Board in the first instance determines if there is a question
whether a City employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a
discharge, and if there is a question, the Board is required to request an opinion
from the City Attorney. Ms. Knighton's letter does not comply with these
Procedures, is arbitrary and constitutes a denial of process.
If Ms. Knighton sought legal advice prior to preparing her September 21 letter,
this raises additional concerns. The Procedures provide that the City Attorney
shall train and advise the City labor relations officer in all matters related to the
Board's authority and due process. See Procedures, Section I.F. In this case,
such advice raises the same issue about conflict of interest that seeking a formal
Elizabeth T. Dunning elizabeth.dunning@hro.com
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Sait Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 tel 801.521.5800 fax 801.521.9639
#230095 vl

Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
Attorneys at Law

Ralph E. Chamness
September 28, 2007
Page 2
opinion from the City Attorney under Section IILG. would present. If Ms.
Knighton sought legal advice from her immediate supervisor, Lyn Creswell,
who is an attorney, the conflict of interest issue remains because, although he is
currently serving as Salt Lake City Chief Administrative Officer, he retains the
right to return to his senior attorney position in the City Attorney's Office, and,
in any event, all legal advice must be rendered under the authority of the City
Attorney.
Other serious conflict of interest issues arise in the way in which Ms. Howick's
appeal has-been handled. The City labor relations officer at the time Ms.
Howick's appeal was filed on September 10,2007, was Marco Kunz. Ms.
Kunz took no action on the appeal and has now obtained Ms. Howick's former
position as counsel for the Salt Lake City Department of Airports. Ms.
Knighton, Ms. Kunz's former supervisor, then sent her letter purporting to
deprive Ms. Howick of any right to appeal her discharge.
The City's Conflict of Interest ordinance requires that City employees avoid
even the appearance of impropriety and more specifically that when an
individual employee's interests may be affected by a decision, that the conflict
be disclosed and the employee not be involved in the decision. It further
prohibits employees from using their positions to further their own or others
professional interests. Salt Lake City Code, Sections 244.030 and 040. The
Employee Appeals Board Procedures are also sensitive to issues of conflict of
interest. For instance, they provide that the City labor relations officer must
impanel Board members for an appeal who are least likely to have personal
knowledge regarding the matter. See Section IV.B. Such attention to conflicts
of interest does not appear to have been exercised at any point in the handling
of Ms. Howick's appeal, and these facts raise serious questions. We are not
aware of any conflict of interest waiver issued by the City in this matter, and,
for the reasons set forth above, the City Attorney could not properly grant such
a waiver in this matter. Salt Lake City Code, Section 2.44.180.
We ask that the City follow its Procedures and comply with the law without the
influence of the conflicts that have seriously affected Ms. Howick and impaired
City processes. Further, as you and I discussed in connection with obtaining an
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Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
Attorneys at Law

Ralph E. Chamness
September 28,2007
Page 3
opinion prior to Ms. Knighton sending her letter because Mr. Rutan took the
action being challenged in Ms. Howick's appeal, he has a conflict of interest in
writing the required opinion. The opinion must therefore be provided by an
unbiased and independent attorney knowledgeable in the law.
Ms. Howick had been an outstanding City employee for 15 years until she was
discharged based on an alleged at will status and informed that this was a
business decision incident to a change in a department head. Ms. Howick has
been trying to resolve this matter amicably through reinstatement to her
employment and continues to believe this is possible and in the best interests of
both parties. If the city will act in good faith and without conflicts of interest,
this matter can be readily resolved.
If it is the City's position that Ms. Knighton's letter is the final action or order
of the Employee Appeals Board, does she intend to certify the decision to the
City Recorder as required by Section I.G of the Procedures? If she does not
and the City intends Ms. Knighton's September 21 letter to be the only and
final action or order of the Employee Appeals Board and Salt Lake City, please
let me know immediately and in writing so Ms. Howick can proceed with the
appeal process.

Very truly yours,

Elizabetn T. Dunning
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Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
Attorneys at Law

SALT LAKE CITY

BOULDER

COLORADO SPRINGS

DENVER

SENT VIA FACSIMILE
AND U.S. MAIL
536-6111
October 19,2007
Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Jodi Howick

Dear Mark:
LONDON

LOS ANGELES

MUNICH

SAN FRANCISCO

Thank you for your letter of today's date and for returning my telephone call to
your office so promptly. As I told you when we spoke, it is important for Salt
Lake City to clarify how it intends to handle Ms. Howick's appeal of her
termination from this point.
The Utah Municipal Code and the City's Employee Appeals Board Procedures
make clear that the appeal of a termination is to be conducted and concluded
promptly. Under the Utah Municipal Code, the employee has only ten days to
file a notice of appeal with the city recorder. U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(3)(a). The
Code requires the recorder to refer the matter to the appeal board "forthwith,"
and the appeal board must commence its investigation and hear the matter
"forthwith." U.C.A. §10-3-1106(3)(b)(i) and (ii). The appeal board has only
15 days from the date of the referral to certify its decision to the city recorder,
unless for good cause and with the consent of the employee and the city, the
board extends the time for certifying its decision to a "maximum" of 60 days.
U.C.A. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) and (ii). Once the appeal board receives the appeal
from the city recorder, if there is a question whether a City employee is within
the class of persons who may appeal a discharge, the Board must request a legal
opinion, ordinarily from the City Attorney. The City Attorney must render an
opinion "no later than the next business day after a request is received."
Employee Appeals Board Procedures, IH.G.
Elizabeth T. Dunning elizabeth.dunning@hro.com
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2263 tel 801.521.5800 fax 801.521.9639
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Mark Gavre
October 19,2007
Page 2
Jodi Ho wick filed her Notice of Appeal on September 10, 2007 and presumably
the City Recorder provided a copy of the appeal to the City labor relations
officer the next day. We are therefore long past the 15 day period in which
appeal boards are required to act in the absence of consent of the employee.
We have no interest in filing a premature appeal. On the other hand, we are not
willing to continue in limbo outside the process required by the Utah Municipal
Code and the City's own ordinances, policies and procedures and without any
time constraints on the City. For these reasons, it is important for us to know
first, that Ms. Howick's appeal has now been referred to the Employee Appeals
Board and second, whether you have been retained to provide the opinion
contemplated by Section IILG of the City's Employee Appeals Board
Procedures. If you have not been retained to provide that opinion, we would
like to know whether the City has retained someone else to do so.
I understand that you have only recently been retained by the City in this
matter, but given the date of Jamey Knighton's letter, we need to resolve these
issues by Monday, October 22, 2007.
I look forward to talking with you on Monday.
Very truly yours,

ElizafetfrT. Dunning

#231047 vl

EXHIBIT C

RECEIVED
OCT 2 2 2007
Holme, Roberts
&\€>Mft&£yUe
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801.532.1234
Facsimile 801.636.6111

A PROFESSIONAL
LAW COMOKATJON

Salt Lake City • Las Vegas •

Direct Dial
(801) 536-6834
E-Mail
MGavre@parsonsbehle.com

Reno

October 19,2007

VIA FACSIMILE AND MAIL 521-9639
Elizabeth T. Dunning
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Main St., Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Howick v. SLC Corporation

Dear Elizabeth:
I am writing to confirm a point we discussed in the telephone conversation we had
yesterday. It is the position of the Salt Lake City Corporation that the letter from Jamey
Knighton that you received on or about September 21, 2007 does not constitute a final
action or order of the Employee Appeals Board under Section VIII of the Employee
Appeals Board procedures or Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6). Accordingly, no 30-day
period for appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or other time limitation runs from the date of
Ms. Knighton's letter.
I look forward to receiving your letter containing your legal analysis of
Ms. Howick's situation. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Parsons Behle & Latimer

avre
WMG/cmg
cc: Ralph E. Chamness, Esq.
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Parsons
Behle &
Latimer*
W. Mark Gavre
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801.532.1234
Facsimile 801.536.6111

A PROPBSSIOMl
L\W COKi'OKAflQfi

Salt Lake City * Las Vegas • Reno

Direct Dial
(801) 536-6834
E-Mail
MGavre@parson8behIe.com

October 22,2007

RECEIVED
VIA FACSIMILE AND MAIL,521-9639

OCT 2 3 2007

Elizabeth T. Dunning
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Main St., Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Holme, Roberts
& Owen, LLP

Re:

Howick v. SLC Corporation

Dear Elizabeth:
I am writing as a follow up to the telephone conservation we had on Friday
afternoon. At that time I had sent you my letter of October 19, 2007 but had not received
your letter of the same date. I read your letter this morning when I got into the office.
When we spoke on Friday, you asked whether there would any formal action by the
Employee Appeals Board (the "Board"). In your letter, you outline certain steps that you
believe the Board would take in the case of an appeal to the Board. I have now reviewed
the Board's policies and procedures and have concluded that the Board has no jurisdiction
over the termination of Ms. Howick. She was an at-will employee and signed an at-will
agreement in 1998. For your convenience, I enclose a copy of her at-will agreement. The
Board's policies expressly state that they do not cover at-will employees:
2.

Employees Not Covered by this Policy

2.1
This policy does not apply to at-will employees, who may be terminated
with or without cause.

1012690.1

Elizabeth T. Dunning
October 22, 2007
Page Two
Given that the Board's policies and procedures expressly state that they do not apply
to at-will employees and given that Ms. Howick was a long-standing at-will employee, the
Board would not have jurisdiction over Ms. Howick's tennination. Accordingly, the Board
would not be in a position to take any formal action with regard to Ms. Howick's
termination.
Sincerely,
Parsons Behle & Latimer

W. Mark Gavre
WMG/kr
cc: Ralph E. Chamness, Esq.
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DISCLAIM^?
CO

I understand that, if I am appointed by the Salt Lake City Attorney to the
"Appointed Senior City Attorney" position, my employment will be at-will
and will be for no fixed length of time.
I understand that no oral or written statements (in personnel manuals,
policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct of the Mayor, City
Attorney, or other City official at any time, other than in a written contract of
employment signed by the Mayor or City Attorney, can create an express or
implied contract to the contrary.

^±0-

EXHIBIT D

NOTICE OF APPEAL
BEFORE
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD

NAME OF APPLICANT: JodiHowick
ADDRESS OF APPLICANT:

c/o Elizabeth Dunning, Esq.
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP
299 S. Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TELEPHONE: 521-5800 (Ms. Dunning's phone number)

RECEIVED
* - p - fl _
OtT • U IWI
CITY RECORDER

DEPARTMENT: Salt Lake City Attorney's Office
ACTION BEING APPEALED:
Brief description of action: Discharge.
Date of action being appealed: August 31, 2007.
Person who took action: Edwin Rutan
APPELLANT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY: Elizabeth Dunning, Holme Roberts &
Owen, LLP.
SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL:
Appellant worked for Salt Lake City Corporation for fifteen years with numerous City
managers, and she received outstanding performance evaluations. Appellant was
verbally informed by her supervisor that she would be discharged as of August 31,2007,
without any prior notice and without any cause. As the basis for this action, Appellant's
supervisor relied on Appellant's alleged at-will employment status created by the City
contrary to the requirements imposed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and
other laws and policies. Also contrary to those provisions, Appellant's supervisor
indicated that his decision was a business decision incident to changes in a department
head, and the decision may also have been affected by issues incident to changes in
elective officers and otherwise contrary to law and policy. Appellant's supervisor
provided no other basis for the decision and no documentation in connection with the
decision. Appellant respectfully requests reinstatement to her employment based on the
following:

#229214 vl

Appellant's at-will employment status was not lawfully created under Utah Code
Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and other laws and policies, and Appellant is
entitled to the protections of those statutes, laws and policies.
Among other things, the action taken was contrary to the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106 and other laws and policies as a discharge
without any notice and without any cause, and as a discharge incident to changes
in a department head and/or elective officers.
WITNESSES YOU MAY HAVE TESTIFY ON APPEAL:
Edwin Rutan
City Attorney's Office
535-7788
Ralph Chamness
City Attorney's Office
535-7788
Dennis Ferguson
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111
521-5678
Others as may be identified during a discovery process.
DOCUMENTS YOU INTEND TO INTRODUCE AT THE HEARING
Performance evaluations given to Appellant and letter of recognition.
Documents as may be identified during a discovery process.
WHAT ACTION DO YOU WANT THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD TO TAKE:
Appellant respectfully requests reinstatement to her employment with full back pay and
benefits.
I hereby request a hearing before the Employee Appeals Board.

Signatut^of App^llint
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Date

Salt Lake City Corporation
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review
Employee Name:
JODIL.HOWICK
Job Title:
Senior City Attorney
Review Period Start: 1/1/2006
Review Period End:
12/31/2006
Reviewer:
Russ Pack

Goals

5.00

Outstanding performance

Goals covered within the review period.
Section Weight: 50%
Airport penalty processes (part 1)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
14%
Category:
Financial
Description:
Review current penalty and official decision making structures used by the Airport, and reuse
these structures to enhance the legal and operational needs of those processes
Measurement: Review current structures. Identify areas where changes would better address
Airport legal and operational needs. Prepare policies, ordinances and other documents needed to
make changes. Implement the changes.
Airport services organization
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Determine the most appropriate methods for organizing airport profit-generating
rights and services, such as a services corporation, and implement that method.
Measurement: Review possible structures and identify best method. Implement method by
preparing governing documents and required practices.
AUA preparation
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
14%
Category:
Customer
Description:
Compile and review use agreement options that may be advisable for upcoming carrier
negotiations. Prepare a proposed draft recommending text that reflects best practices and updated
legal provisions. Assist with negotiation efforts.
Measurement: Compile documents from other airports that I don't already have. Prepare outline
identifying and recommending potential provisions. Prepare draft of a new agreement for review
by Airport management.
Contract forms revisions (part 1)

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Review form documents used for Airport contracts. Identify need for additional
forms. Prepare standardized language for common provisions based on current law and best
practices. Write form specific provisions based on current law and best practices. Prepare and
issue new forms, and maintain official copies.
Measurement: Compile a list of forms and identify needs for new forms. Complete
standardized sections for City and federal requirements, and common boiler provisions.
Complete rewrites for leasing and real property forms.
Implement Airport policy system (part 2)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
15%
Category:
Workforce Quality
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living
wages that will benefit City procurement.
Measurement: Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all
factors for consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge.
Pursue Airport legislative issues
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the
legislative process to obtain passage of issues.
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented.
Pursue Kern River Ltigation (part 2)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2006
Weight:
15%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Pursue the needs of the litigation to defend the City's interests. Pursue settlement
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare
documents and strategies in support of the case.
Measurement: Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available
court rulings. Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions.

Competencies

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Competencies selected by Airport and Division management
Section Weight: 50%
Quality Management
Weight: 20%
Fosters quality focus in others
Sets clear quality requirements
Measures key outcomes
Solicits and applies customer feedback
Improves processes, products, and services

Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality.
She sots quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding.
Leadership
Weight: 20%
Exhibits confidence in self and others
Inspires respect and trust
Reacts well under pressure
Shows courage to take action
Motivates others to perform well

5.00

Outstanding performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best
performance from others.
Adaptability
Weight: 20%
Adapts to changes in the work environment
Manages competing demands
Accepts criticism and feedback
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her
performance. JODI smoothly adapts her approach to meet the needs of any situation she
encounters.
Customer Focus
Weight: 20%
Displays courtesy and sensitivity
Responds promptly to service requests
Identifies customer needs
Explains services clearly
Handles difficult situations

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise
and easy to understand. JODI excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer
situations.
Job Knowledge
Weight: 20%

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Competent in required job skills and knowledge
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills
Keeps abreast of current developments
Requires minimal supervision
Displays understanding of how job relates to others
Uses resources effectively

5
5
5
J
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements.
JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to
her.
Summary
Summarizes performance during the review period.

5.00

Outstanding performance

Development Plans
Plan developed and agreed upon to enhance employee career movement.

Employee Comments

Reviewer Comments

Employee Acknowledgment
I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree
with the evaluation.

Employee Sigtfciture/lJbtg

J&oWt n?~- l^-r-Oo

Reviewer Signatun

Next Level Signature

Salt Lake City Corporation
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review
Employee Name:
Job Title:
Executive Director
Review Period Start: 1/1/2005
Review Period End: 12/31/2005
Reviewer:
Russell Pack

Goals
Goals covered within the review period.

5.00

Outstanding performance

Section Weight: 50%
Airport penalty processes (part 1)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
14%
Category:
Financial
Description:
Review current penalty and official decision making structures used by the Airport, and reuse
these structures to enhance the legal and operational needs of those processes.
Measurement: Review current structures. Identify areas where changes would better address
Airport legal and operational needs. Prepare policies, ordinances and other documents needed to
make changes. Implement the changes.
Airport services organization
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Determine the most appropriate methods for organizing airport profit-generating
rights and services, such as a services corporation, and implement that method.
Measurement: Review possible structures and identify best method. Implement method by
preparing governing documents and required practices.
AUA preparation
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
14%
Category:
Customer
Description:
Compile and review use agreement options that may be advisable for upcoming carrier
negotiations. Prepare a proposed draft recommending text that reflects best practices and updated
legal provisions. Assist with negotiation efforts.
Measurement: Compile documents from other airports that I don't already have. Prepare outline
identifying and recommending potential provisions. Prepare draft of a new agreement for review
by Airport management.

Contract forms revisions (part 1)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Review form documents used for Airport contracts. Identify need for additional
forms. Prepare standardized language for common provisions based on current law and best
practices. Write form specific provisions based on current law and best practices. Prepare and
issue new forms, and maintain official copies.
Measurement: Compile a list of forms and identify needs for new forms. Complete
standardized sections for City and federal requirements, and common boiler provisions.
Complete rewrites for leasing and real property forms.
Implement Airport policy system (part 2)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
15%
Category:
Workforce Quality
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living
wages that will benefit City procurement.
Measurement: Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all
factors for consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge.
Pursue-Airport legislative issues
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
14%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the
legislative process to obtain passage of issues.
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented.
Pursue Kern River Litigation (part 2)
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2005
Weight:
15%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Pursue the needs of the litigation to defend the City's interests. Pursue settlement
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare
documents and strategies in support of the case.
Measurement: Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available
court rulings. Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions.
Competencies
5.00
Competencies selected by Airport and Division management.

Outstanding

performance

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Section Weight: 50%
Quality Management
Weight: 20%
Fosters quality focus in others
Sets clear quality requirements

5
5
5

Measures key outcomes
Solicits and applies customer feedback
Improves processes, products, and services

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality.
She sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding.
Leadership
Weight: 20%
Exhibits confidence in self and others
Inspires respect and trust
Reacts well underpressure
Shows courage to take action
Motivates others to perform well

5.00

Outstanding performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other
peopled abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best
performance from others.
Adaptability
Weight: 20%
Adapts to changes in the work environment
Manages competing demands
Accepts criticism and feedback
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation

5.00

Outstanding performance

5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI isflexibleand innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her
performance. JODI smoothly adapts her approach to meet the needs of any situation she
encounters.
Customer Focus
Weight: 20%
Displays courtesy and sensitivity
Responds promptly to service requests
Identifies customer needs
Explains services clearly
Handles difficult situations

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise
and easy to understand. JODI excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer
situations.

Job Knowledge
Weight: 20%
Competent in required job skills and knowledge
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills
Keeps abreast of current developments
Requires minimal supervision
Displays understanding of how job relates to others
Uses resources effectively

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Her expert level of knowledge and job skills enables her to frequently exceed the job
requirements. JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually
monitors developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it.
Her thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to her.
Summary
Summarizes performance during the review period.

5.00

Outstanding performance

Development Plans
Plan developed and agreed upon to enhance employee career movement.

Employee Comments
Reviewer Comments
Employee Acknowledgment
I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree
with the evaluation.

\«F*A^Q

Reviewer Signature/Date

Next Level Signature

'

Salt Lake City Corporation
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review
K5
O

Employee Name:
Job Title:
Review Period Start:
Review Period End:
Reviewer:

JODIL. HOWICK
Appt Sr. City Atty.
1/1/2004
12/31/2004
Tim Campbell

Goals
Goals covered within the review period.

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Section Weight: 50%

Airline bankruptcy preparations
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
16%
Category:
Financial
Description: Review Delta's arrangements with the Airport, and those of other carriers in or
nearing bankruptcy. Address issues that can be structured to create more favorable results in
bankruptcy. Monitor carrier activities.
Measurement: Monitor carrier account balances and advise on collection activities to maintain
accounts at no more than 30 days. Create a list of all Delta contracts with the Airport and
recommend any needed changes under those agreements. Recommend and/or take actions on
other issues.
Create City Value-Based Procurement Pro
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
17%
Category:
Customer
Description: Work with procurement committee to create a program using factors such as living
wages that will benefit City procurement.
Measurement:
Finalize program in accordance with the Mayor's schedule. Incorporate all factors for
consideration. Create a program that will withstand legal challenge.

Finalize adoption of Airport Use Agreeme
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
17%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Assist with issues arising as AUAs are signed. Draft Supplemental Agreements
needed to implement loading bridge arrangements.
Measurement: All AUA signed. All Supplemental Agreements signed.

Implement Airport policy system
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
17%
Category:
Workforce Quality
Description: Create a system that facilitates policy adoption at the Airport. Draft forms and
guidelines, and work with each Airport division to discuss responsibilities for policy adoption and
the maintenance of policies. Initiate process to work with each division to revise the current
manual and address their needs.
Measurement:
Draft form and guidance documents. Meet with each division to kick off the process. Provide
legal review for policies submitted. Compile and maintain the policy book.
Pursue Airport legislative issues
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
16%
Category:
Financial
Description: Identify legislative needs (federal, state and local). Prepare text, and work with the
legislative process to obtain passage of issues.
Measurement: Draft text, and obtain passage of bills and ordinances presented.
Pursue Kern River Litigation
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
12/31/2004
Weight:
17%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Pursue needs of the litigation to defend the City's interest. Pursue settlement
options as they may become available. Manage outside counsel and direct the case, and prepare
documents and strategies in support of the case.
Measurement:
Respond to all case deadlines. Manage costs effectively. Obtain best available court rulings.
Provide documents and advice in support of settlement discussions.

Competencies

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Competencies selected by Airport and Division management.
Section Weight: 50%
Quality Management
Weight: 20%
Fosters quality focus in others
Sets clear quality requirements
Measures key outcomes
Solicits and applies customer feedback
Improves processes, products, and services

5.00

Outstanding p erf orman ce

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Because JODI is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality.
She sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates
provide thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. JODI proactively gathers and
incorporates feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward
the improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding.

Leadership
Weight: 20%
Exhibits confidence in self and others
Inspires respect and trust
Reacts well under pressure
Shows courage to take action
Motivates others to perform well

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best
performance from others.
Adaptability
Weight: 20%
Adapts to changes in the work environment
Manages competing demands
Accepts criticism and feedback
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her
performance. JODI smoothly adapts her approach to meet the needs of any situation she
encounters.

Customer Focus
Weight: 20%
Displays courtesy and sensitivity
Responds promptly to service requests
Identifies customer needs
Explains services clearly
Handles difficult situations

5.00

Outstanding performan ce

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

JODI treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise
and easy to understand. JODI excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer
situations.
Job Knowledge
Weight: 20%
Competent in required job skills and knowledge
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills
Keeps abreast of current developments
Requires minimal supervision
Displays understanding of how job relates to others
Uses resources effectively

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
J
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements.
JODI shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job
relates to others. JODI obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to
her.
Summary
Summarizes performance during the review period.

5.00

Outstanding

Development Plans
Plan developed and agreed upon to enhance employee career movement.

Employee Comments

performance

Reviewer Comments

Employee Acknowledgment
I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree
with the evaluation.

Next Level Signature

Salt Lake City Corporation
AIR - Director's Office Performance Review
Employee Name:
Job Title:
Review Period Start:
Review Period End:
Reviewer:

JODIL. HOWICK
Appt. Sr. City Atty.
1 /1/2003
12/31/2003
Timothy Campbell

Goals
Goals covered within the review period.

5.00

Outstanding performance

5.00

Outstanding performance

Section Weight: 50%

AIR-Legal-Establish Service Priorities
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
12%
Category:
Customer

Description: Work with Airport divisions to establish legal service priorities.
Measurement:
Produce a white paper regarding division needs and priorities
AIR-Legal-Establish Service Priorities-2
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
13%
Category:
Customer

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Description:
Provide timely and accurate support to the Airport's contract administration processes.
Measurement:
Compile data re: needs, actions, turn-around times and tracking methods, and determine best
practices.
AIR-Legal-Facilitate policy implement
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
13%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness

5.00

Outstanding

performance

Description: Facilitate the Airport's adoption and use of departmental rules and policies, and
work toward implementation
Measurement:
Develop and implement an interim legal review and adoption process, and develop a white paper
regarding overall structural needs

AIR-Legal-Facilitate policy implement.-2
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
12%
Category:
Efficiency/Effectiveness
Description: Structure appropriate contractual relationships with the airlines, and work toward
implementation with Airport staff
Measurement:
Produce a base negotiations document with negotiation options.
AIR-Legal-Protect Airport Assets
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
13%
Category:
Financial
Description:
Review and revise measures in Airport contracts and practices to protect Airport assets against
financial risk.
Measurement:
Prepare list of enhanced terms and practices, and follow an implementation schedule.
AIR-Legal-Protect Airport Assets-2
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
12%
Category:
Financial
Description:
Review and revise contract language and legal processes to enhance the Airport's ability to
recover sums due.
Measurement: Prepare list of enhanced terms and practices, and follow an implementation
schedule.
AIR-Legal-Pursue Training Resources
5.00
Outstanding performance
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
13%
Category:
Workforce Quality
Description: Identify and pursue training and resources that will enhance effectiveness
Measurement:
Track training and resource use and determine its effectiveness
AIR-Legal-Pursue training resources-2
5.00
Due Date:
6/30/2003
Weight:
12%
Category:
Workforce Quality
Description:
Continue to make the work environment pleasant
Measurement:
Celebrate special occasions as a staff at least once a month

Outstanding

performance

Competencies

5.00

Outstanding performance

Competencies selected by Airport and Division management.
Section Weight: 50%

Quality Management
Weight: 20%
Fosters quality focus in others
Sets clear quality requirements
Measures key outcomes
Solicits and applies customer feedback
Improves processes, products, and services

5.00

Outstanding performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Because Jodi is extremely motivating, others are inspired to put a strong emphasis on quality. She
sets quality requirements that are exceptionally well defined. The measures she creates provide
thorough and accurate results regarding key outcomes. Jodi proactively gathers and incorporates
feedback to continuously strengthen customer satisfaction. Her contributions toward the
improvement of processes, products, and services are outstanding.

Leadership
Weight: 20%
Exhibits confidence in self and others
Inspires respect and trust
Reacts well under pressure
Shows courage to take action
Motivates others to perform well

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Jodi maintains a high level of self-confidence and clearly communicates her belief in other
people's abilities. Through her actions she has earned the complete respect and trust of other
people. She performs exceptionally well in high-pressure situations and she demonstrates strong
leadership by never hesitating to take action. She exhibits an impressive ability to inspire the best
performance from others.
Adaptability
Weight: 20%
Adapts to changes in the work environment
Manages competing demands
Accepts criticism and feedback
Changes approach or method to best fit the situation

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Jodi is flexible and innovative in quickly adapting to job or workplace changes, often taking the
initiative to help others do the same. She shows exceptional skill in handling competing demands
on her time. She recognizes the value of constructive criticism and uses feedback to improve her
performance. Jodi smoothly adapts her approach to meet the needs of any situation she
encounters.

Customer Focus
Weight: 20%
Displays courtesy and sensitivity
Responds promptly to service requests
Identifies customer needs
Explains services clearly
Handles difficult situations

5.00

Outstanding

performance

5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Jodi treats all customers with the highest degree of sensitivity, courtesy, and respect. She is
extremely responsive to requests for service. She is especially perceptive at identifying the needs
of customers, always seeking clarification when necessary. Her explanation of services is precise
and easy to understand. Jodi excels at resolving the most difficult or emotional customer
situations.
Job Knowledge
Weight: 20%
Competent in required job skills and knowledge
Exhibits ability to learn and apply new skills
Keeps abreast of current developments
Requires minimal supervision
Displays understanding of how job relates to others
Uses resources effectively

5.00

Outstanding performance

5
5
5
5
5
5

Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance
Outstanding performance

Her expert level of knowledge and job skill enable her to frequently exceed the job requirements.
Jodi shows an exceptional ability to master and apply new skills. She continually monitors
developments in her field, sharing information with others who might benefit from it. Her
thorough job knowledge enables her to perform her job responsibilities with little or no
supervision or assistance. She demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how her job
relates to others. Jodi obtains the maximum benefit from the tools and resources available to her.

Summary

5.00

Outstanding

Summarizes performance during the review period.

Development Plans
Plan developed and agreed upon to enhance employee career movement.
Strengths to build on
1 - Continue ACI involvement
2 - ABA Air & Space Forum editorial board
3 - Teach Westminster Aviation Law class

performance

Employee Comments

Reviewer Comments

Employee Acknowledgment
I have reviewed this document and discussed the contents with my manager. My signature means
that I have been advised of my performance status and does not necessarily imply that I agree
with the evaluation.
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Reviewer Signature/Dqjtc1^

Next Level Signature

2g*W

c^, —^- ^^

DHEDEE CORRADINI '.lavor
^

V-AACf

^4U^

LOUISE MILLEfi Execunve Director
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Peter R. Huntsman
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D:nL Skaggs
Roger M Smedley
Richard R Sterner
Elaine B. Wets

July 12, 1994

Mr, Roger Cutler, Esq.
City Attorney
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South State Street, Room 505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Roger:
Jodi provided me with a copy of the "Highlights from 1993-94"
that she submitted to you regarding the work she performed for the
Salt Lake City Airport Authority. Obviously, it is difficult to
summarize accomplishments for an entire year in a two page
memorandum; however, she has hit on the highlights from last year.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with my comments
regarding Jodi's performance. She is one of the most responsible
and dedicated individuals I have had the pleasure of working with.
Assignments are completed in a timely manner with thorough research
and a reasonable basis for the conclusions presented.
Jodi is
willing to put in the necessary time to complete projects with very
compressed schedules to meet the demanding requirements of
operating a major large hub airport, served by two reliever
airports.
The Salt Lake City Airport Authority is continually
recognized for outstanding performance in many areas and Jodi's
contributions to our success are significant.
I appreciate you recognizing the tremendous demands we face
regarding full time, in-house legal counsel, over and above the
requirements we have for litigation support, condemnation
proceedings, insurable liability claims, employment issues and
particular issues requiring specific legal expertise. Having Jodi
available at all times has certainly made my job easier and
provides me the opportunity to make critical decisions, that have
legal implications, in a timely matter to better serve our tenants
and the travelling public.
Thanks again for your support of the Airport Authority's
programs and I look forward to another productive and successful
year.
Sincerely,

Louis E. M i l l e r
cutler

Salt Lake City Airport Authority
AMF Box 22084, Salt Lake City, Utah 84122
801.575.2400

Fax:801-575.2679

SALT 'j\KE CITY CORTQRATTON
'300" Series Performance Evaluation Tabulation Sheet

Department

Employee

Law

Social Security Number

Jodi Howick

Date

Job Title A s s t . City Atty ESp Class

9/14/93
Job Code

320-M

4 206

To finalize an employee evaluation the following sheet should be canpleted and
the original returned to the Office of Personnel Management, The department
should retain the yellow copy for its records* Completed employee evaluation
sheets (Job Skills and Behaviors) should be kept by the department. They should
not be sent to the personnel department unless requested by the supervisor or em-

£loyee.
JOB SKILLS
Weight

Legal writing

1.

20%

Legal reasoning^

20%

D e p t . knowledge**

20%

Strategy

20%

& tactics

Litigation ski&s

20%

Supervisor

4C

Employee

Second
Supervisor

£L
J5L

4-

5L
-V-±-

.51

!L
fT

-£-

4-

!L

DIMENSIONS
1.

Canmunication
Skills

2.

Supervisory

5T

£L

<T

4

V

M

1*

Skills
3.

Job Knowledge

4.

Productivity

5*

Organization

6.

Cooperative

If you approve granting the
attach a canpleted PER-400 V
Supervisor's Signature
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f
f

JSL.

k t h e box
Date

cJ^
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EXHIBIT E

Elizabeth T. Dunning, Esq. (#3896)
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2263
Telephone: (801) 521 -5800
Facsimile: (801) 521-9639

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Thir
r:_£0
C Judicial District
UTA
H APPELLATE COURTS
QCJ
OCT 2 ? flffl?
SALT
""'
ey.
UKE COUNTY

Attorneys for Petitioner

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JODI HOWICK,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Petitioner,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Respondent.
Notice is hereby given that Petitioner Jodi Howick, by her attorney Elizabeth T.
Dunning, pursuant to U.C.A. 10-3-1106 appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final
action or order on the appeal of Petitioner to the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
entered in this matter by letter to Petitioner from the City Labor Relations Officer, dated
September 21,2007.
The appeal is taken from the entire final action or order.
Dated this SLot"^ day of October, 2007.
'xooofcLT
Elizaheih T. Dunning
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this ^Qs^ day of October, 2007, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served by U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, as follows:
W. Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Respondent Salt Lake City
Corporation

m
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APPENDIX 5

SAM GUEVARA

**£&& \2®2™J MKKUL M^M^a^*«^l*^SI

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES
D I V I S I O N OF H U M A N R E S O U R C E MANAGEMENT

August 7,2008
Elizabeth Dunning
Holme Roberts & Owens, L.L.P.
299 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Requested Documentation
Dear Ms. Dunning,
Enclosed is the documentation you requested concerning the Jodi Howick appeal.
Sincerely,

Shelly Chapman
Human Resource Consultant
Cc:

W. Mark Gavre
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edwin P. Rutan, II
City Attorney
Salt Lake City Corporation
Human Resources
Salt Lake City Corporation

4 5 1 S O U T H STATE S T R E E T , R O O M 1 1 5 , S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H B 4 1 1 4 - 5 4 6 4
M A I L I N G A D D R E S S : P.O. BOX 1 4 5 4 6 4 , S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H B 4 1 1 4 - 5 4 6 4
T E L E P H O N E : BO 1 - 5 3 5 - 7 9 0 O

FAX: 8 0 1 - 5 3 5 - 6 6 1 4

i RECYCLED PAPER

RALPH BECKER
MAYOR

